Wednesday, January 01, 2020

Welcome

I study economics as a hobby. My interests lie in Post Keynesianism, (Old) Institutionalism, and related paradigms. These seem to me to be approaches for understanding actually existing economies.

The emphasis on this blog, however, is mainly critical of neoclassical and mainstream economics. I have been alternating numerical counter-examples with less mathematical posts. In any case, I have been documenting demonstrations of errors in mainstream economics. My chief inspiration here is the Cambridge-Italian economist Piero Sraffa.

In general, this blog is abstract, and I think I steer clear of commenting on practical politics of the day.

I've also started posting recipes for my own purposes. When I just follow a recipe in a cookbook, I'll only post a reminder that I like the recipe.

Comments Policy: I'm quite lax on enforcing any comments policy. I prefer those who post as anonymous (that is, without logging in) to sign their posts at least with a pseudonym. This will make conversations easier to conduct.

Wednesday, July 11, 2018

Neoliberals, Liberals, Progressives, Social Democrats, and Democratic Socialists

I guess this is a post on current events in the United States. Some articles I have recently found interesting are:

I take it socialists want to work towards a society in which, "The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Karl Marx). The idea is that each person should be able to develop their talents to the fullest extent possible, both for their own sake and to contribute as much as possible to society. This is a Christian idea as well, put forth in the parable of the talents (Matthew 25, verses 14-30).

I think traditional conservatives do not agree. They think the vast majority must be consigned to nasty and grubby grunt work. Only those at the top can flourish. Neoliberals put forth a vision of personal development which I find narrow and stilted. In neoliberalism, everybody is an investor developing their human capital for validation by the market. If you have a skill that does not pay - too bad. You wasted your time. For more on this, see Wendy Brown's Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution.

Somewhere in here I should probably say something about meritocracy. Also, if one wants to look for authoritative Marxist-Leninist accounts of the distinction between socialism and communism, one might look at Marx's private letter, Remarks on the Gotha Program, or Lenin's State and Revolution. But these documents are not what this post is about, since they do not seem relevant to why debates on the post topic are current events.

A crucial question, I think, is whether capitalism could ever be a society in which the free development of all is possible. Social democrats say, "Yes". They think the cruelties of capitalism can be tamed with a generous enough welfare state. One might say, they want a capitalism with a human face. Democratic socialists think not. They want to eventually move beyond capitalism.

I do not see that social democrats and democratic socialists need disagree on immediate, short term programs. Such a tactical coalition can include progressive and liberals. I was curious that none of those three articles linked at the top mentioned Eduard Bernstein. Sure, Otto Von Bismarck created many elements of the first welfare state, as a reactionary response to growing worker power. One might also mention Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum, on the rights and duties of labor. But Bernstein's Marxist reformism - "The movement is everything, the final goal is nothing" - is also important in considering the historical origins of social democracy and democratic socialism.

I was annoyed with Wilentz's suggestion that those further left than him have forgotten John Maynard Keynes. Keynes was historically and globally important in designing the post war Bretton Woods system, a system that brought general prosperity for three decades. For national and international policies, Gunnar Myrdal, Michel Kalecki, Nicholas Kaldor, and Joan Robinson had some influence. Myrdal and Kalecki came to their Keynesianism independently of Keynes.

Where democratic socialists want to go when transcending capitalism is not exactly clear. I do not see that they need to agree. Developing sovereign wealth funds; developing Universal Basic Income (UBI) programs; and supporting labor unions, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), and workers cooperatives are elements of a program fairly radical for these barbaric times.

Update (14 July 2018): A Nicholas Colin article in Medium. There's probably a lot more on-topic current articles.

Friday, June 29, 2018

Lack Of Rigor In Mas-Colell, Whinston, And Green

Whether or not the government should intervene in the economy is a false choice. Government and the economy are not two separate and non-intertwined entities.

The standard introductory graduate microeconomics textbook now current was written by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green. This happens to be from Chapter 15, in the part on the Edgeworth box:

"We can now verify a simple but important fact: Any Walrasian equilibrium allocation ... necessarily belongs to the Pareto set... Thus, at any competitive allocation ..., there is no alternative feasible allocation that can benefit one consumer without hurting the other. The conclusion that Walrasian allocations yield Pareto optimal allocations is an expression of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, a result that ... holds with great generality...

The first fundamental welfare theorem provides, for competitive market economies, a formal expression of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand.' Under perfectly competitive conditions, any equilibrium for intervention in the economy is the fulfillment of distributional objectives."

  • Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press (1995): p. 524

Adam Smith was little interested in the allocation of given resources, as compared to economic growth. But put aside the dubious historical claim. I want to focus on other reasons why the above passage is nonsense.

What is an "intervention in the economy"? Here are some examples of what could be interventions:

  • Refusing to permit contracts in which people sell themselves into slavery.
  • Banning child labor.
  • Banning the enforcement of clauses in deeds which prohibit owners, in perpetuity, from selling their property to jews, negroes, or members of some other groups.
  • Requiring sellers of food in grocery stores to list the amount of the Recommended Daily Allowance of various vitamins and minerals provided by that food.
  • Inventing a legal structure in which people can form corporations which limit their legal liability.
  • Banning people from copying some books, computer source code, DVDs, and making them freely available or selling them.

Whether to count these as interventions could be viewed as a political question. I would like to think the first four are not current questions. Law provides a background, often taken as given, on which buying and selling can be based. What contracts will be backed up by government varies with time and place.

Some elements of this background that are disputed at the moment, at least by those who can attract the attention of the owners of the means of communication. An alteration or decision on a disputed element could be defined as a matter of government intervention in the economy. But such a definition does not seem to have any place in a mathematical theorem.

What counts as property is a question closely related to what counts as an intervention. It is easy easy to write, "Let ω be a vector of endowments..." But whether or not something is an endowment also varies with time, space, and the legal background. Examples that come to my mind without much thinking include air rights in New York City, a capability of a eight-year old to supply so many hours of labor, and wombs in a society where one can contract for surrogate motherhood.

Notice that conventions on contracts and property law shape the distribution of income. The distribution of income is a subject that mainstream economists have been notoriously poorly-trained to discuss.

Mainstream economists may think they are getting a rigorous introduction to economics, what with the "maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols" (Keynes) in their books. They are also getting, however, a replication of a confused naturalization and reification of the economy common in popular discourse.

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

The Loss From Trade With Capital Goods: The Sraffian Bonus Can Be Negative

I have written up this result here

Abstract: Paul A. Samuelson extends the Ricardian theory of foreign trade to a model of small open economies in which countries can trade semi-finished capital goods on international markets, as well as trade in produced consumer goods. He argues that this extension provides an additional gain from trade, which he labels the Sraffian bonus. This article demonstrates that trade in consumer and capital goods can result in a loss for an economy, given positive rates of profits in the trading countries, as compared with trade in consumer goods only. In other words, the Sraffian bonus can be negative.

Saturday, June 16, 2018

A Country Worse Off With Trade In Capital Goods

Figure 1: PPFs in Portugal
1.0 Introduction

This post continues these two posts. I change the model here to have wages advanced, not paid out of the surplus at the end of the year.

I here consider an example of a model of stationary states in which two countries can trade in produced commodities to be used for consumption. The countries face given prices on international markets for traded commodities. (They are small open economies, in the jargon.) I take the rate of profits as given in each country. They may differ, since I assume that finance capital cannot be traded internationally. I also assume labor is immobile between countries.

I contrast the model with and without foreign trade being possible in capital goods. Paul Samuelson calls the supposed gains from trade in capital goods the Sraffian bonus. This post demonstrates that the Sraffian bonus can be negative. The inhabitants of a country might be better off, in the sense that the total bundle of consumption goods is larger, if international markets do not exist in capital goods.

2.0 Parameter Values

I assign the numeric values in Table 1 to coefficients of production. For those who do not want to click, a unit of steel can be made in England from a direct and unassisted labor input of l2, C, E person-years. A unit of corn can be made from one unit of steel and l1, C, E. A unit of linen is made from l1, L, E person-years of direct and unassisted labor.

Table 1: Technology for the Example
ParameterEnglandPortugal
l1, C, n37
l2, C, n22
l1, L, n12
Ln11
rn300%400%

I take the endowments of labor - LE and LP person-years, respectively - as given. Production Possibility Frontiers (PPFs) are constructed per worker.

I also take rates of profits, rE and rP, as given. I do not strive for realism. But, if you are concerned by the sizes of the rates of profits, pretend that my "year" is actually a decade or so.

3.0 Stationary States with and without Trade in Capital Goods

I now consider what prices could be consistent with stationary states.

First, suppose foreign trade is not possible in capital goods. Only corn and linen can be traded on international markets. Suppose prices are as in Table 2. The cost of producing linen in England:

l1, L, E wE (1 + rE) = 1 (1/6) (1 + 3) = 2/3

If firms in England manufacture linen for both domestic consumption and for foreign trade, they make the going rate of profits. The cost of producing corn in England is:

[l2, L, E (1 + rE) + l1, L, E] wE (1 + rE) = [2 (4) + 3](1/6)(4) = 22/3

Firms in England will not want to produce corn. They would be undercut by foreign competition. You can do the analogous calculations for Portugal. Portuguese firms will produce corn and the needed steel to continue production. They will not produce linen. With these prices and this specialization, consumers in both countries can consume baskets of commodities containing both corn and linen. And firms will be minimizing costs.

Table 2: Example with Foreign Trade in Corn and Linen
VariableEnglandPortugal
PC6
PL2/3
Cost of producing corn22/36
Cost of producing linen2/312/7
SpecializationLinenCorn and Steel
wn1/66/85

Suppose now that international markets exist in corn, linen, and steel. Table 3 shows prices for consideration in this case. One tabulates the cost of producing corn with the steel input evaluated at the international price. For example, the cost of producing corn in England is:

(PS + l1, C, E wE) (1 + rE) = [1 + 3 (1/6)](4) = 6

Going through these tabulations, one will find that the firms in England specialize in producing corn and linen. The cost of producing steel in England exceeds its price. Likewise, firms in Portugal specialize in producing steel. Cost-minimizing firms in Portugal are unwilling to produce either corn or linen.

Table 3: Example with Foreign Trade in Corn, Linen, and Steel
VariableEnglandPortugal
PC6
PL2/3
PS1
Cost of producing corn617/2
Cost of producing linen2/31
Cost of producing steel4/31
SpecializationCorn and LinenSteel
wn1/61/10

Notice that the international prices of corn and linen are unchanged between Tables 2 and 3. Steady states are here shown as resulting in an increased wage in Portugal when foreign trade is possible in steel. But rates of profits and the wage in England are shown as constant.

3.0 Production Possibility Frontiers

What about physical quantities of commodities? I restrict myself to stationary states. Figure 2 shows PPFs in England. The PPF under autarky is constructed from technical data on coefficients of production and the endowment of labor in England. When only linen is produced in England, whether foreign trade is possible or not, the same amount of linen is produced as under autarky. Consequently, all three PPFs are shown as rotated around the same intercept in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PPFs in England

Consider England when foreign trade is only possible in corn and linen. Since England specializes in linen, the maximum amount of corn consumed by the English is (LE/l1, L, E)(PL/PC). In this example, that quantity is less than LE/(l1, C, E + l2, C, E), the maximum quantity of corn consumed in England without foreign trade.

When foreign trade is also possible in steel, the maximum quantity of corn manufactured in England is (LE/l1, C, E) units. But not all of this corn can be consumed. Steel must be purchased from Portugal to continue production on the same scale. That is, (LE/l1, C, E)(PC - PS) numéraire units are available for consumption. So the maximum corn consumption in England is (LE/l1, C, E)(PC - PS)/PC units of corn. For England, the Sraffian bonus is positive. The possibility of foreign trade in steel has left the PPF for domestic consumption rotated outwards, even beyond the maximum consumption under autarky.

The situation in Portugal, as illustrated by Figure 1 at the top of this post, is quite different, however. Foreign trade in consumer, but not capital goods, results in a PPF rotated outwards from the autarkic PPF. This conforms to the nonsense long-suffering students in economics taught out of mainstream textbooks must endure. At the prices considered above, Portugal produces only steel when foreign trade is possible in all produced goods. The maximum amount of linen that can be consumed in Portugal is (LP/l2, C, E)(PS/PL) units. Neither intercept with an axis for this PPF is equal to the corresponding intercept for autarky. Furthermore, the PPF with foreign trade in all goods is strictly inside the PPF with foreign trade only in consumer goods. The Sraffian bonus is negative. Suppose one compares the PPF with foreign trade in all goods to the autarkic PPF for Portugal. Whether or not there are gains from trade is ambiguous. It depends on the consumption basket.

4.0 Conclusion

So this post has extended long-ignored proofs that the theory of comparative advantage does not provide a valid a-priori argument for so-called free trade. Opening up markets in capital goods may not provide a country with more goods, setting aside problems of adjustment.

I know of some empirical work purporting to demonstrate gains from trade. I do not know of any that addresses the issues brought forth in this post.

References
  • Paul A. Samuelson (2001). A Ricardo-Sraffa Paradigm Comparing Gains from Trade in Inputs and Finished Goods. Journal of Economic Literature 39, 4: 1204-1214.
  • Ian Steedman (1980). Trade amongst Growing Economics. Cambridge University Press.

Thursday, June 07, 2018

More On Foreign Trade In Consumer And Capital Goods

Figure 1: Rates Of Profits for Specialization in Consumer Goods
1.0 Introduction

This post is a continuation of this example. How a country specializes in foreign trade depends on distribution. And foreign trade can reduce the consumption basket to be divided among the inhabitants of a country, as compared with autarky.

2.0 Patterns of Specialization

Assume that the consumption basket in both countries contains both corn and linen. In a steady state, international prices and the distribution of income in both countries must be such that at least one country produces each one of the three commodities. Table 1 lists the six possible patterns of specialization in which each commodity is produced in exactly one country. If foreign trade is possible in consumer goods, but not in capital goods, steel must be produced in the same country in which corn is produced. Only cases 2 and 5 are possible. All six cases must be analyzed if foreign trade is possible in both consumer and capital goods.

Table 1: Patterns of Specialization
CaseEnglandPortugal
1CornLinen, Steel
2LinenCorn, Steel
3SteelCorn, Linen
4Linen, SteelCorn
5Corn, SteelLinen
6Corn, LinenSteel

A pattern of specialization is compatible, given the technology, with certain rates of profits between the trading countries. Under the assumption that financial capital does not flow between countries, the rate of profits may vary between countries. Insofar as the determinants of distribution is unspecified, the model is open. A neoclassical closure would specify intertemporal utility-maximizing consumers in each country

Disequilibrium transitions paths are also not considered here. Firms could find their expectations, with which they have produced or bought capital goods, disappointed. Presumably along such paths, trade might be unbalanced, and exchange rates could vary. Keynesian considerations of effective demand come into play. The elasticities of the demands for imports and exports might be of some importance, as reflected in the Marshall-Lerner conditions. The convergence of such transition paths to steady states does not seem assured.

3.0 Trade in Consumer Goods

Consider the model under the assumption that international markets do not exist for steel. Suppose England specializes in the production of linen, and Portugal specializes in the production of corn, as in case 2. Then the international prices of linen and corn must be related:

l1, L, E/(vC, E + l2, C, E rE) < PL/PC
PL/PC < l1, L, P/(vC, P + l2, C, P rP)

Hence:

l1, L, E/(vC, E + l2, C, E rE) < l1, L, P/(vC, P + l2, C, P rP)

Or:

rP < (l1, L, P l2, C, E rE + l1, L, P vC, E - l1, L, E vC, P)/(l1, L, E l2, C, P)

A specific region in the space for the national rates of profits corresponds to each pattern of specialization. Figure 1, above, shows these two regions, as divided by the upward-sloping line. The figure is drawn under the assumption that England has a comparative advantage in producing linen.

4.0 Production Possibility Frontiers (PPFs)

A production possibility frontier (PPF) shows the upper limits on how much linen or corn can be consumed in a given country in a stationary state. Let YC, n represent bushels corn consumed, and let YL, n be the square-yards of linen consumed, where n = E or P for England or Portugal. Let LE and LP be the endowments of labor in England and Portugal, respectively.

I want to consider three PPFs. Here is the PPF for autarky, when a country does not have the possibility to engage in foreign trade:

l1, L, n YL, n + vC, n YC, n = Ln

The PPF for a country specializing in the production of corn is:

vC, n (PL/PC)YL, n + vC, n YC, n = Ln

The PPF for a country specializing in the production of linen is:

l1, L, n YL, n + l1, L, n (PC/PL) YC, n = Ln

Figure 2 graphs these PPFs. The possibility of foreign trade rotates the autarkic PPF, with the pivot on an axis, depending on which product the country specializes in. I have drawn the PPFs such that when the country specializes in the production of linen, it is worse off as a whole. If any corn is consumed at all, foreign trade results in a smaller commodity basket than under autarky.

Figure 2: Production Possibility Frontiers for One Country

4.1 Comparison of PPFs for Autarky and Specialization in Corn

For a country specializing in corn, the ratio of the international price of linen to the international price of corn is bounded above:

PL/PC < l1, L, n/(vC, n + l2, C, n rn)

For a non-negative rate of profits, the right-hand side cannot exceed l1, L, n/vC, n. Hence:

PL/PC < l1, L, n/vC, n

Or:

(Ln/l1, L, n) < (Ln/vC, n)(PC/PL)

The left-hand side is the maximum consumption of linen for this country under autarky. The right-hand side is the corresponding maximum consumption when the country specializes in producing corn. Thus, in this simple model, specialization in corn when no foreign markets in steel exist, unambiguously rotates the PPF outwards. In a comparison of stationary states, foreign trade gives the country specializing in producing corn a greater consumption basket to distribute among its inhabitants.

4.2 Comparison of PPFs for Autarky and Specialization in Linen

On the other hand, specialization in linen could make a country worse off. For the PPF to be rotated inward, one must have:

(Ln/l1, L, n)(PL/PC) < (Ln/vC, n)

Or:

PL/PC < l1, L, n/vC, n

So a country experiences a loss from trade when it specializes in linen and the following condition holds:

l1, L, n/(vC, n + l2, C, n rn) < PL/PC < l1, L, n/vC, n

Notice a loss from trade is not possible when the rate of profits is zero.

Suppose rates of profits and prices are such that England specializes in the production of linen. Prices can be such that England can gain from trade if and only if:

l1, L, E/vC, E < l1, L, P/(vC, P + l2, C, P rP)

Or:

rP < (l1, L, P vC, E - l1, L, E vC, P)/(l1, L, E l2, C, P)

The right-hand side can be positive if and only if England has a comparative advantage in producing linen when rates of profits are zero in both countries.

5.0 Conclusion

So in this simple model, when international markets exist in consumer goods, but not in capital goods:

  • Which country specializes in producing corn and which in producing linen depends on domestic rates of profits.
  • Only one pattern of specialization for a given pair of rates of profits is possible.
  • For each pattern of specialization, a pair of rates of profits exists for that specialization.
  • If a country specializes in producing corn, its PPF is rotated outwards.
  • If a country specializes in producing linen, its PPF may be rotated outwards, but only if:
    • The country has a (technologically-defined) comparative advantage in producing linen.
    • The relative price of linen on international markets is high enough.
  • The PPF may be rotated inwards when a country specializes in producing linen; the terms of trade matter.

I am finding it non-obvious how to complete this analysis when steel can be traded in foreign markets. Also, I should create numerical examples just to confirm my results.

Saturday, June 02, 2018

Ideological Innocence Of The Fox News Viewer

1.0 Introduction

This post deals with a set of ideas that I find appealing, but contradictory. I know I do not fully understand many of them. Perhaps somebody who understands more can either agree with me that there are contradictions here or point to some way of resolving them. This post is also more about current events than is typical of my posts.

2.0 Ideological Thinking, Ideological Identification, And Party Identification

Consider Philip Converse's claim that a mass majority of the public is innocent of ideology, as contrasted with the non-innocence of elites. I know these ideas best as filtered through Kinder and Kalmoe (2017).

Ideological thinking is not a defect, in Kinder and Kalmoe's account. An ideology, such as liberalism or conservatism in contemporary America, structures how you understand and retains facts. Otherwise, the world, in at least its political aspects, will appear as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Ideological thinking can be seen in a couple of ways. First, when surveying people about issues, you can listen to how they justify their stance. Do they refer to liberalism or conservatism? Second, do they exhibit a certain constraint on issues. For example, if they are against abortion generally being illegal, are they also against the death penalty? (Kinder and Kalmoe define issues narrowly. They do not consider a take on whether a larger or smaller government is desirable as a political issue, as opposed to a more philosophical issue.)

Kinder and Kalmoe note that being informed about politics takes quite a bit of work. I think their take goes along with some of Ahler and Broockman's findings on so-called moderates. It is not that moderates necessarily take middle-of-the road positions on issues. Rather, they may take extreme sides on different issues, with no awareness of how they go together, including in prevailing ideologies among those who pay more attention to politics. Apparently, survey questions to test your knowledge of politics are fairly rudimentary. Common practice is to base an assessment on less than twenty multiple-choice questions like: How long is a senator's term? What is Paul Ryan's position? What party was Franklin Delano Roosevelt a member of?

Kinder and Kalmoe distinguish ideological thinking (non-innocence) from both ideological identification and party identification (also known as partisan identification). In the period of their data they find a closer correlation between ideological identification and partisanship, but there are still plenty of people who call themselves conservatives and Democrats. After taking into account of partisanship and stands on issues, ideological identification counts for little.

3.0 Pyschological Traits of Liberals and Conservatives

I think the literature on social psychology about traits among liberals and conservatives is meant to apply to mass publics. John Jost and Jonathan Haidt are the most prominent writers I know of here.

Jost claims liberals are more open to experience; are tolerant of uncertainty; have less need for order, structure, and closure; have more tolerance of ambiguity and less dogmatism; have less fear of death, threat, and loss; and have higher self-esteem. Conservatives are otherwise. Haidt says that liberals' moral intuitions emphasize the avoidance of harm/the provision of care and fairness and reciprocity. Conservatives include these moral concerns. But they also worry more about in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity and sanctity.

How does this literature relate to ideological thinking, ideological identity, and partisanship among mass publics in the United States? As I understand Kinder and Kalmoe, they recognize this contrast. They argue that Jost misunderstands their work, and his traits only gets you to ideological identification. I can see how one could be authoritarian, in personality, and be a strong Democrat or even further left. Could an anti-authoritarian be a strong Republican in the current conjecture?

Do those who have read these literatures think more could be said here?

4.0 Marshall McLuhan And Media

How is all of the above modified by contemporary events? Once upon a time, those on the left decried the biases of the corporate media. They wanted more explicitly class-based channels that were not afraid to affirm a point of view. It is not what they meant, but we now have Fox News. And they explicitly treat "liberal" as a swear word. How much will a regular viewer get a message, which, if accepted and absorbed, will lead to issue constraint, in Kinder and Kalmoe's sense? (Chemtrails are not an issue.)

But if one worries about the message on Fox News, could one accept Marshall McLuhan's take on media? Supposedly reading encourages analytical, linear thought, while television extends your nervous system to be irritated by going-ons throughout the global village. Would this not be just as true for messages on other television channels? Should one just reject McLuhan's approach?

5.0 Some Caveats

In looking at international data, Kinder and Kalmoe convert "liberal" and "conservative" to "left" and "right". I would not call myself a liberal - I would say I'm more somewhere between a democratic socialist and a social democrat. Those who reject the labels "Liberal" and "Conservative", Kinder and Kalmoe classify as non-ideological. I do not know how I would have answered those survey questions. By the way, I voted on a certain resolution on the New York State ballot last time without knowing much about it, but on the grounds that labor unions were opposed. This group-based approach is not ideological thinking, as I understand Kinder and Kalmoe. A Catholic paying attention to the Church's teaching might endorse both making abortion illegal and getting rid of the death penalty. So they would not exhibit, at least on this issue, the kind of constraint Kinder and Kalmoe take as demonstrating ideological thinking. I doubt that many non-elites fall outside their classification, but how could one know?

References
  • Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman (2015). Does Polarization Imply Poor Representation? A New Perspective on the "Disconnect" Between Politicians and Voters
  • Pierre Bayard (2007). How to Talk About Books You Haven't Read
  • Philip E. Converse (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics
  • Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, V. 96, no. 5: pp. 1029-1046.
  • Jonathon Haidt (2013). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion
  • John J. Jost et al. (2003). Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition
  • Donald Kinder and Nathan P. Kalmoe (2017). Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public
  • Marshall McLuhan (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy
  • Marshall McLuhan (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man