Showing posts with label Political Science. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Political Science. Show all posts

Friday, July 31, 2026

Competing Ballot Propositions

I have occasionally written about vote-counting protocols.

Onondaga County is to the west of me. Syracuse, NY, is their major city. Members of the county legislature currently have term limits of 12 years. Twelve years is three terms. They are currently arguing about term limits for the County Executive, of 12 or 16 years. The Democrats support the former, and the Republicans support the latter. The County Executive is currently a Republican.

The County Executive has proposed a curious set of ballot initiatives, leaving it up to the voters. One initiative will set a term limit of twelve years. Another will set a term limit of sixteen years. If neither initiative gets a majority of votes, the County Executive will continue to serve without a term limit. If both pass, the one with more votes will prevail.

I do not know if any precedent exists in New York State for dueling ballot initiatives, and, apparently, some argument exists among the county legislature about this question. I suspect the results of votes on California ballot initiatives have posed some such challenge of interpretation.

How to draw district lines and how to count votes is an interesting mathematical question. This question is often entangled with racism in the United States, both in ensuring white supremacy and in fighting it.

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Mass Publics Apathetic About Democratic Norms?

This post gestures to a worrisome argument that could be constructed by combining arguments from certain references. It is also more about current events than most posts on this blog.

Philip Converse's argument that most members of the mass public are ideologically innocent has long been influential among political scientists. Why should those who have families to raise, bills to pay, and jobs to take up their time pay much attention to the details of politics?

Barber and Pope (2018) provides recent empirical evidence, from something like a natural experiment, that conservative Republicans, especially, are unprincipled. Their results are based on a survey conducted in early 2017, before Trump had a record as governing. Since Trump does not care to know anything about anything, one can truthfully report statements of him supporting either side on almost any issue. The survey contained questions on minimum wages, taxes, abortion, immigration, gun control, Iran, health care, climate change, planned parenthood. Some surveys just asked the questions. Others reported Trump's opinion in a liberal direction. Others reported Trump's opinion in a conservative direction. "[L]ow knowledge respondents, strong Republicans, Trump-approving respondents, and self-described conservatives" generally just follow what their leader says.

It is difficult to construct an experiment like this for others. One might think that liberal Democrats might be swayed against a position by hearing that it is Trump's position. But one would like to find an authority that they accept that is equally inconsistent. Otherwise, one would have to assign views in a survey that are not truthful. As I understand it, the latter is what Jaydani and Chang (2019) do in demonstrating that mainstream economists are unprincipled. They show agreement with a statement among economists depends on whether it is assigned to a mainstream economist or to a heterodox economist.

Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue that a democracy deteriorates into something like fascism when gate keepers fail to uphold democratic norms. I do not know if this is an example, but journalists are trained in an ethic in which one is supposed to disclose an interest in a story, if one has one. Sean Hannity, for example, violated this norm when he reported on Michael Cohen and Trump's violation of campaign finance laws; Cohen was Hannity's lawyer for certain real estate transactions. Calling the press "the enemy of the people" is a fascist slogan. American First is a slogan for pro-Nazis. Presidents do not accuse the Chairman of the Federal Reverse of playing politics. Whatever one may think of these norms, I do not expect many watchers of, say, Fox News to worry about this sort of rhetoric unless it is pointed out to them by authorities they trust.

Mark Tushnet's 2004 concept of constitutional hardball is another discussion of democratic norms in the United States. And he argued that they were being violated, partly in a tit-for-tat fashion. For example, how willing is Congress to give advise and consent to qualified appointees of the President when he is of the other party? Fishkin and Pozen argue that a willingness to throw out norms that uphold our system of government is not symmetrical.

Stanley (2018) can be read as suggesting that the effects of elites and gate keepers to fail to uphold democratic norms can be cumulative. Anti-intellectualism and a disrespect for truth leads followers to be unaware of norms being violated. Conspiracy theorizing and a sense of victimhood increases. Followers become less accepting of reasoned argument and more dismissive of those not in their hierarchy.

To summarize: members of mass publics cannot be expected to understand the risks of willful and blatant violation of democratic norms without leadership. In the give and take of politics, our leaders have been not upholding such norms and, in fact, have been discarding them. Perhaps a process of cumulative causation is underway that can lead to nowhere good.

References

Saturday, June 02, 2018

Ideological Innocence Of The Fox News Viewer

1.0 Introduction

This post deals with a set of ideas that I find appealing, but contradictory. I know I do not fully understand many of them. Perhaps somebody who understands more can either agree with me that there are contradictions here or point to some way of resolving them. This post is also more about current events than is typical of my posts.

2.0 Ideological Thinking, Ideological Identification, And Party Identification

Consider Philip Converse's claim that a mass majority of the public is innocent of ideology, as contrasted with the non-innocence of elites. I know these ideas best as filtered through Kinder and Kalmoe (2017).

Ideological thinking is not a defect, in Kinder and Kalmoe's account. An ideology, such as liberalism or conservatism in contemporary America, structures how you understand and retains facts. Otherwise, the world, in at least its political aspects, will appear as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Ideological thinking can be seen in a couple of ways. First, when surveying people about issues, you can listen to how they justify their stance. Do they refer to liberalism or conservatism? Second, do they exhibit a certain constraint on issues. For example, if they are against abortion generally being illegal, are they also against the death penalty? (Kinder and Kalmoe define issues narrowly. They do not consider a take on whether a larger or smaller government is desirable as a political issue, as opposed to a more philosophical issue.)

Kinder and Kalmoe note that being informed about politics takes quite a bit of work. I think their take goes along with some of Ahler and Broockman's findings on so-called moderates. It is not that moderates necessarily take middle-of-the road positions on issues. Rather, they may take extreme sides on different issues, with no awareness of how they go together, including in prevailing ideologies among those who pay more attention to politics. Apparently, survey questions to test your knowledge of politics are fairly rudimentary. Common practice is to base an assessment on less than twenty multiple-choice questions like: How long is a senator's term? What is Paul Ryan's position? What party was Franklin Delano Roosevelt a member of?

Kinder and Kalmoe distinguish ideological thinking (non-innocence) from both ideological identification and party identification (also known as partisan identification). In the period of their data they find a closer correlation between ideological identification and partisanship, but there are still plenty of people who call themselves conservatives and Democrats. After taking into account of partisanship and stands on issues, ideological identification counts for little.

3.0 Pyschological Traits of Liberals and Conservatives

I think the literature on social psychology about traits among liberals and conservatives is meant to apply to mass publics. John Jost and Jonathan Haidt are the most prominent writers I know of here.

Jost claims liberals are more open to experience; are tolerant of uncertainty; have less need for order, structure, and closure; have more tolerance of ambiguity and less dogmatism; have less fear of death, threat, and loss; and have higher self-esteem. Conservatives are otherwise. Haidt says that liberals' moral intuitions emphasize the avoidance of harm/the provision of care and fairness and reciprocity. Conservatives include these moral concerns. But they also worry more about in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity and sanctity.

How does this literature relate to ideological thinking, ideological identity, and partisanship among mass publics in the United States? As I understand Kinder and Kalmoe, they recognize this contrast. They argue that Jost misunderstands their work, and his traits only gets you to ideological identification. I can see how one could be authoritarian, in personality, and be a strong Democrat or even further left. Could an anti-authoritarian be a strong Republican in the current conjecture?

Do those who have read these literatures think more could be said here?

4.0 Marshall McLuhan And Media

How is all of the above modified by contemporary events? Once upon a time, those on the left decried the biases of the corporate media. They wanted more explicitly class-based channels that were not afraid to affirm a point of view. It is not what they meant, but we now have Fox News. And they explicitly treat "liberal" as a swear word. How much will a regular viewer get a message, which, if accepted and absorbed, will lead to issue constraint, in Kinder and Kalmoe's sense? (Chemtrails are not an issue.)

But if one worries about the message on Fox News, could one accept Marshall McLuhan's take on media? Supposedly reading encourages analytical, linear thought, while television extends your nervous system to be irritated by going-ons throughout the global village. Would this not be just as true for messages on other television channels? Should one just reject McLuhan's approach?

5.0 Some Caveats

In looking at international data, Kinder and Kalmoe convert "liberal" and "conservative" to "left" and "right". I would not call myself a liberal - I would say I'm more somewhere between a democratic socialist and a social democrat. Those who reject the labels "Liberal" and "Conservative", Kinder and Kalmoe classify as non-ideological. I do not know how I would have answered those survey questions. By the way, I voted on a certain resolution on the New York State ballot last time without knowing much about it, but on the grounds that labor unions were opposed. This group-based approach is not ideological thinking, as I understand Kinder and Kalmoe. A Catholic paying attention to the Church's teaching might endorse both making abortion illegal and getting rid of the death penalty. So they would not exhibit, at least on this issue, the kind of constraint Kinder and Kalmoe take as demonstrating ideological thinking. I doubt that many non-elites fall outside their classification, but how could one know?

References
  • Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman (2015). Does Polarization Imply Poor Representation? A New Perspective on the "Disconnect" Between Politicians and Voters
  • Pierre Bayard (2007). How to Talk About Books You Haven't Read
  • Philip E. Converse (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics
  • Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, V. 96, no. 5: pp. 1029-1046.
  • Jonathon Haidt (2013). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion
  • John J. Jost et al. (2003). Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition
  • Donald Kinder and Nathan P. Kalmoe (2017). Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public
  • Marshall McLuhan (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy
  • Marshall McLuhan (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man

Tuesday, July 04, 2017

Voting Efficiency Gap: A Performative Theory?

Table 1: Distribution of Votes Among Parties and Districts
DistrictToriesWhigsTotal
I5149100
II5149100
III3367100
Total135165300
1.0 Introduction

This post, amazingly enough, is on current events. Stephanopoulos and McGhee have developed a formula, the efficiency gap, that measures the partisanship of the lines drawn for legislative districts. In this post, I present a numerical illustration of this formula and connect it to current events. I conclude with some questions.

2.0 Numerical Example

Consider a population of 300 voters divided between two parties. The Whigs are in the majority, with 55% of the electorate. Suppose the government has a three-member council, with each member elected from a district. And each district contains 100 voters.

2.1 Drawing Districts

The Tories, despite being the minority party have drawn the districts. The votes in the last election are as in Table 1. The Tories are in the minority of the population, but hold two out of three council seats.

The Tories, in this example, cannot win all seats. In the seats they lose, they want to pack as many Whigs as possible. So where the Whigs win, they win overdominatingly. Many of the Whig votes in that single district are wasted on running up a victory more than necessary. On the other hand, the Tories try to draw their winning districts to win as narrowly as possible. The Whig votes in the districts in which the Whigs lose are said to be cracked.

This is an extreme example, sensitive to small variations in the districts in which the Tories win. They would probably want safer majorities in those districts.

As far as I can see, the drawing of odd-shaped district lines is not necessary for gerrymandering. Consider a city surrounded by suburbs and a rural area. Suppose, that downtown tends to vote differently than the suburbs and rural areas. One could imagine district lines drawn outward from the central city. Depending on relative populations, that might distribute the urban voters such that they predominate in all districts. On the other hand, one might create a few compact districts in the center to pack many urban voters, with the ones remaining in cropped pizza slices having their votes cracked.

2.2 Wasted Votes

Define a vote to be wasted if either it is for a losing candidate in your district or it is for a winning candidate, but it exceeds the number needed for a majority in that district. The number of wasted votes for each party in the numerical example is:

  • The Tories have 33 wasted votes.
  • The Whigs have 49 + 49 + (67 - 51) = 114 wasted votes.

The efficiency gap is a single number that combines the number of wasted votes in both parties. An invariance property arises here. As I have defined it, the number of wasted votes, summed across parties, in each district is 49. Forty nine is one less than half the number of votes in a district. This is no accident.

2.3 Arithmetic

In calculating the efficiency gap, one takes the absolute value of the difference between the parties in the number of wasted votes. In the example, this number is | 33 - 114 | = 81.

The efficiency gap is the ratio of this positive difference to the number of voters. So the efficiency gap in the example is 81/300 = 27%.

3.0 Contemporary Relevance in the United States

The United States Supreme Court has decided, in a number of cases over the last decades, that gerrymandering might be something they can rule on. Partisan redistricting is not purely a political issue that they do not want to get involved in. Apparently, however, they have never found a clear example.

But what is gerrymandering? Can they define some sort of rule that lower courts can use? How would politicians drawing up district lines know whether or not their decisions will withstand challenges in court? Apparently, Justice Kennedy, among others expressed a hankering for some such rule in his decision in League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) vs. Perry (2006).

Gill vs. Whitford is a current case on the Supreme Court docket. And the efficiency gap, which is relatively new mathematics, may be discussed in the pleadings, at least, in this case.

So the creation of the mathematical formula illustrated above might affect the law in the United States. If so, it will impact how districts are drawn and what some consider fair. It is interesting that I can now raise the issue of the performativity of mathematics in a non-historical context, while the mathematics is, perhaps, performing.

4.0 Questions

I am working on reading two of the three references below. (Articles in law reviews seem to be consistently lengthy.) I have some questions and comments.

Berstein and Duchin (2017) seems to raise some severe objections. Suppose the election in a district with 100 voters is decided either 75 to 25 or 76 to 24. The way I have defined it, the difference in wasted votes in this district is (24 - 25) or (25 - 24). That is, this district contributes one vote to the difference in wasted votes. So the definition of the efficiency gap privileges races that are won with 75% of the vote.

Consider a case in which one party has support from 75 percent of the voters. Suppose the districts are drawn such that each district casts 75% of their votes for that party. So this party wins 100% of the seats and the efficiency gap is minimized. Do we want to say this is not an example of gerrymandering?

Is the efficiency gap related to power indices somehow or other? How should the efficiency gap be calculated if more than two parties are contesting an election? Mayhaps, one should calculate the efficiency gap for each pair of parties. This loses the simplicity of a single number. Also, sometimes clever Republican strategists might try to help themselves by helping the Green Party, at the expense of the Democratic Party. How does this measure compare and contrast with other measures? As I understand it, a measure of partisan swing, for example, relies on counterfactuals, while the efficiency gap is not counterfactual.

References

Saturday, October 08, 2016

Why Republicans in the USA are "The stupid party"

1.0 Introduction

In 1865, John Stuart Mill, when he was almost 60, was elected to Parliament. He represented the radical wing of the Liberal party. He had been a public intellectual for decades, with lots of books, editorials, and articles for the Tories to draw on in attacking him. Some Tories overreached. This led to the conservative party becoming known as "The stupid party".

2.0 Adventures in Parliament

I find Mill's attitude towards being a Member of Parliament (MP) unusual, albeit consistent with his stated opinions. He was not interested in giving speeches in support of his party's view when many others were willing to do so. He "in general reserved [him]self for work which no others were likely to do." (from his Autobiography. Uncited quotes below are from this book.) He had such opportunities, for few radicals were in Parliament. (Earlier in his life, such a group was known in Britain as the Philosophical Radicals.)

Despite his radicalism, some of his advocacy was in opposition "to what then was, and probably still is, regarded as the advanced liberal opinion". For example, Mill was against abolishing capital punishment and "in favour of seizing enemies' goods in neutral vessels".

But other efforts seem more progressive, when viewed from the standpoint of later times. In a speech on Gladstone's Reform Bill, Mill argued for sufferage of the working class. He also promoted women's sufferage through his parliamentary work. He put out a pamphlet for reforming British rule in Ireland, including "for settling the land question by giving to existing tenants a permanent tenure, at a fixed rent." He joined in an organization that attempted to have British officers in Jamaica prosecuted, in a criminal case. These officers had engaged in killing, flogging, and general brutality, under the pretence of having civilians brought before court-martials.

3.0 Considerations on Representative Government

J. S. Mill had long been what we would call a public intellectual. I want to particularly focus on his book with the above title. He gives a qualitative discussion of particular voting games. Mill was for proportional representation, also known then as "personal representation". And Mill recommended Thomas Hare on the topic. Other issues he considered include:

  • Provide multiple votes (a greater weight) to more highly educated members of the electorate.
  • Giving voters multiple votes for distributing in elections for a district that had multiple members to elect to a council.
  • Working class and women's sufferage.
  • The advantages and disadvantages of a secret ballot (as opposed to an open one).
  • The advantages and disadvantages of having a two-stage election (e.g., the electoral college, Senators being elected by a state's legislature.
  • The advantages and disadvantages of an upper house (e.g., the Senate, the House of Lords), under various assumptions about its composition.
  • Whether or not the chief executive should be independently elected (e.g., the President of the United States) or by the legislature (e.g., the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom).
  • How the central government and localities should interact and what should the authority and responsibility of each be.

In short, Mill seems to write about concerns often of interest today in analytical political science, albeit in a qualitative way and grounded in concrete practices in his time.

4.0 Attention and the Aftermath

The Tories in Parliament took advantage of Mill's long paper trail. In debates, they would ask if he wanted to defend some of his previous written statements. Because of Mill's forthrightness, this strategy backfired:

"My position in the House was further improved... by an ironical reply to some Tory leaders who had quoted against me certain passages of my writings, and called me to account for others, especially for one in 'Considerations on Representative Government,' which said that the Conservative party was, by the law of its composition, the stupidest party. They gained nothing by drawing attention to the passage, which up to that time had not excited any notice, but the sobriquet of 'the stupid party' stuck to them for a considerable time afterwards."

Considerations on Representative Government contains this passage:

"...It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.

Those who have seen and felt, in some degree, the force of these considerations, have proposed various expedients by which the evil may be, in greater or lesser degree, mitigated. Lord John Russell, in one of his Reform Bills, introduced a provision that certain constituencies should return three members, and that in these each elector should be allowed to vote only for two; and Mr. Disraeli, in the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact by reproaching him for it, being of opinion, apparently, that it befits a Conservative statesman to regard only means, and to disown scornfully all fellow-feeling with any one who is betrayed, even once, into thinking of ends."

And that passage has this footnote (which I read as noting the existence of negative partisanship):

"his blunder of Mr. Disraeli (from which, greatly to his credit, Sir John Pakington took an opportunity soon after of separating himself) is a speaking instance, among many, how little the Conservative leaders understand Conservative principles. Without presuming to require from political parties such an amount of virtue and discernment as they that they should comprehend, and know when to apply, the principles of their opponents, we may yet say that it would be a great improvement if each party understood and acted upon its own. Well would it be for England if Conservatives voted consistently for every thing conservative, and Liberals for every thing liberal. We should not then have to wait long for things which, like the present and many other great measures, are eminently both the one and the other. The Conservatives, as being by the law of their existence the stupidest part, have much the greatest sins of this description to answer for; and it is a melancholy truth, that if any measure were proposed on any subject truly, largely, and far-sightedly conservative, even if Liberals were willing to vote for it, the great bulk of the Conservative party would rush blindly in and present it from being carried." (emphasis added.)

I assume Mill's refers to the following statement, in parliamentary debates, as his "ironical reply":

"I did not mean that Conservatives are generally stupid; I meant, that stupid persons are generally Conservative. I believe that to be so obvious and undeniable a fact that I hardly think any honourable Gentleman will question it."
5.0 Conclusion

And so, to this day, the more conservative party in some countries, such as the United States, is sometimes called "The stupid party".

References
  • J. S. Mill (1861). Considerations on Representative Government
  • J. S. Mill (1873). Autobiography of John Stuart Mill

Saturday, September 24, 2016

Parliamentary Parties In A Presidential System and the Failure of the Principle of Subsidiarity

1.0 Introduction

Some have argued that the Republican Party, in the United States of American, has been acting, since Newt Gringrich's speakership of the house, more like a parliamentary party1. And that this creates tensions in a presidential system2, like the USA. I think I have located another tension that, so far as I know, had not been previously identified when I started this post, months ago3.

People line up in local elections often for local reasons, to pursue local interests. In mass publics, even the political leaders in town, district, city, county, and municipal systems cannot be expected be knowledgeable about national issues and political ideology. In big-tent parties, the aggregate of such local movements need not form coherent ideologies. But when at least one national party is dominated by ideological beliefs, local politics might tend to be seen through an ideological lens. Not only might local political bickering become more bitter and rancorous, local politicians might become less responsive to specific characteristics of their areas. Federalism will work worse. Delegating decisions to the lowest authority possible among municipalities, states, and nations does not necessarily lead to more democratically responsive decisions, in some sense.

2.0 Local Politics

County-level splits in big-tent political parties do not result in ideological shifts. Suppose there are both right and left wings in two dominant political parties in a country, and these ideological spectra overlap. One party might be more dominant in one region than another. How urban and rural populations; ethnic groups; landholders, financiers, industrialists, professionals, small business owners, and workers line up might vary among regions. Once, say, in the 1950s, the Democrats were the party in the USA of southern whites and urban ethnic immigrants from southeastern Europe. And Republicans were simultaneously the party of African-Americans and big business4. Supporting a party at a local level, switching sides, and so on need not reflect strong ideological view in such circumstances. It could be a matter of simply seeking more resources for an interest group.

Once upon a time in Chicago, the Democratic party was extremely dominant, and the party was run like many another big city machine. Harold Washington was a successful reform candidate who became major. The old-time machine politicians had to go somewhere, and they became Republicans. Whatever local tensions were involved in it, this kind of local party split and reforming of one party need not align with any national movement.

The county I live in has two urban centers. As I understand it, the Democrats are traditionally dominant in the larger city, and the Republicans are dominant in mine. We have had in both cities, in my memory, mayors that were either independent - in the sense, that they ran on neither party line - or bipartisan, in that he ran on both.

So there are two examples of alignments in local politics that might be said to be more about interest groups, and less about ideological movements. Politics in the USA has been becoming more ideological and falling along a one-dimensional continuum (Hare & Poole, 2013). And I think that has affected local politics.

Update:

Rogers (2016) does show that state legislative elections are dominated by national politics. But he does not show any break in such trends with national politics becoming more partisan. But I have stumbled upon Abramowitz and Webster (2015), which support my thesis. I do not know of any literature investigating national effects on local elections, as I postulate.

Footnotes
  1. For this post, I am more interested in the first paragraph in the following quotation. The second paragraph is probably the most widely quoted passage from this book, partly because of Ornstein's standing among right-leaning think tanks and partly because of an accompanying Washington Post editorial:
  2. "...we identify two overriding sources of dysfunction. The first is the serious mismatch between the political parties, which have become as vehemently adversarial as parliamentary parties, and a governing system that, unlike a parliamentary democracy, makes it extremely difficult for majorities to act. Parliamentary-style parties in a separation-of-powers government are a formula for willful obstruction and policy irresolution. Sixty years ago, Austin Ranney, an eminent political scientist, wrote a prophetic dissent to a famous report by an American Political Science Association committee entitled 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.' The report, by prominent political scientists frustrated with the role of conservative Southern Democrats in blocking civil rights and other social policy, issued a clarion call for more ideologically coherent, internally unified, and adversarial parties in the fashion of a Westminister-style parliamentary democracy like Britain or Canada. Ranney powerfully argued that such parties would be a disaster within the American constitutional system, given our separation of powers, separately elected institutions, and constraints on majority rule that favor cross-party coalitions and compromise. Time has proven Ranney dead right - we now have the kinds of parties the report desired, and it is disastrous.

    The second is the fact that, however awkward it may be for the traditional press and nonpartisan analysts to acknowledge, one of the two major parties, the Republican Party, has become an insurgent outlier - ideologically extreme; contemptuous of the inherited social and economic policy regime; scornful of compromise; unpersuaded by conventional understanding of facts, evidence, and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition. When one party moves this far from the center of American politics, it is extremely difficult to enact policies responsive to the country's most pressing challenges." -- Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (2012).

  3. From an agenda-setting paper on the differences between presidential and parliamentary systems:
  4. "...the president's strong claim to democratic, even plebiscitarian, legitimacy [stands out]... Following ...Walter Bagehot, ... a presidential system endows the incumbent with both the 'ceremonial' functions of a head of state and the 'effective' functions of a chief executive, thus creating an aura, a self-image, and a set of popular expectations which are all quite different from those associated with a prime minister, no matter how popular he may be.

    But what is most striking is that in a presidential system, the legislators, especially when they represent cohesive, disciplined parties that offer clear ideological and political alternatives, can also claim democratic legitimacy... [W]hen a majority of the legislature represents a political option opposed to the... president...[,] who has the stronger claim to speak on behalf of the people: the president or the legislative majority that opposes his policies? ... One might argue that the United States has successfully rendered such conflicts 'normal' and thus defused them... [T]he uniquely diffuse character of American political parties - which ironically, exasperates many American political scientists and leads them to call for responsible, ideologically disciplined parties - has something to do with it... [T]he development of modern political parties, particular in socially and ideologically polarized countries, generally exacerbates, rather than moderates, conflicts between the legislative and the executive." -- Juan Linz (1990): pp. 53-54.'

  5. But see Steven Rogers' study, highlighted by a Jeff Stein article at Vox.
  6. These are tendencies. It is part of my point that such tendencies might be violated, at some time in some specific locality.
Selected References
  • Alan Abrsmowitz and Steven Webster (2015). All politics is national: The rise of negative partisanship and nationalization of U.S. House and Senate elections in the 21st century.
  • Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole (2013). The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics.
  • Matt Grossmann and David A. Hopkins (2015). Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Politics, Perspectives on Politics, V. 13, No. 1 (Mar.): pp. 119-139.
  • Juan J. Linz (1990). The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, V. 1, No. 1 (Winter): pp. 51-69.
  • Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein (2012). It's Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism, Basic Books.
  • Steven Rogers (2016). National Forces in State Legislative Elections, AAPSS (Sep.): pp. 207-225.

Tuesday, June 28, 2016

Getting Greater Weight For Your Vote May Not Give You Relatively More Power

1.0 Introduction

This post presents a perhaps surprising example of results from measuring political power in a system with weighted voting. I provide examples in which the weight of a person's vote is increased. Yet that voter, in some cases, gains no additional power, in some sense. In one case, by the measures of voting power considered here, the additional weight has no effect on the power of any voter. In another case, another player, with unchanged weight to his vote, is elevated in power with the voter whose weight is increased.

I find these results to be an interesting consequence of power measures. I have not yet found a simple example where the effect on the ranking of voting power is different for the three indices considered here. Nor have I found an example where a voter declines in power with an increase in the weight of his vote.

2.0 An Example of a Voting Game

A voting game is specified as a set of players, the number of votes needed to enact a bill into law (also referred to as passing a proposition), and the weights for the votes of each player. In considering voting games with a small number of players and weighted, unequal votes, one might think of such a game as describing a council or board of directors, where members represent blocs or geographic districts of varying sizes.

As example, consider a set, P, of four players, indexed from 0 through 3:

P = The set of players = {0, 1, 2, 3}

A common way to indicate the remaining parameters for a voting game is a tuple in which the first element is followed by a colon and the remaining elements are separated by commas:

(6: 4, 3, 2, 1)

The positive integer before the colon indicates the number of votes - six, in this case - needed to pass a proposition. The remaining integers are the weights of players' votes. In this case, the weight of Player 0's vote is 4, the weight of Player 1's vote is 3, and so on.

3.0 Two Power Indices

Consider all 16 possible subsets of the four players. These subsets are listed in the first column of Table 1. A subset of players is labeled a coalition. The second column indicates whether or not the coalition for that row has enough weighted votes to pass a proposition. If so, the characteristic function for that coalition is assigned the value unity. Otherwise, it gets the value zero. A player is decisive for a coalition if the player leaving the coalition will convert it from a winning to a losing coalition. The last four columns in Table 1 have entries of unity for each player that is decisive for each coalition. The last row in Table 1 provides a count, for each player, of the number of coalitions in which that player is decisive. The Penrose-Banzhaf power index, for each player, is the ratio of this total to the number of coalitions.

Table 1: Calculations for Penrose-Banzhaf Power Index
CoalitionCharacteristic
Function
Player
0123
{}v( {} ) = 00000
{0}v( {0} ) = 00000
{1}v( {1} ) = 00000
{2}v( {2} ) = 00000
{3}v( {3} ) = 00000
{0, 1}v( {0, 1} ) = 11100
{0, 2}v( {0, 2} ) = 11010
{0, 3}v( {0, 3} ) = 00000
{1, 2}v( {1, 2} ) = 00000
{1, 3}v( {1, 3} ) = 00000
{2, 3}v( {2, 3} ) = 00000
{0, 1, 2}v( {0, 1, 2} ) = 11000
{0, 1, 3}v( {0, 1, 3} ) = 11100
{0, 2, 3}v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 11010
{1, 2, 3}v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 10111
{0, 1, 2, 3}v( {0, 1, 2, 3} ) = 10000
Total:5331

The Shapley-Shubik power index considers the order in which players enter a coalition. For the example, one considers all 24 permutations for the players. The first column in Table 2 lists these permutation. For each row, a player gets an entry of unity in the appropriate one of the last four columns if including that player in a coalition, reading the entries in a permutation from left to right, creates a winning coalition. The Shapley-Shubik power index, for each player, is the ratio of the totals of each of the last four columns to the number of permutations.

Table 2: Calculations for the Shapley-Shubik Power Index
PermutationPlayer
0123
(0, 1, 2, 3)0100
(0, 1, 3, 2)0100
(0, 2, 1, 3)0010
(0, 2, 3, 1)0010
(0, 3, 1, 2)0100
(0, 3, 2, 1)0010
(1, 0, 2, 3)1000
(1, 0, 3, 2)1000
(1, 2, 0, 3)1000
(1, 2, 3, 0)0001
(1, 3, 0, 2)1000
(1, 3, 2, 0)0010
(2, 0, 1, 3)1000
(2, 0, 3, 1)1000
(2, 1, 0, 3)1000
(2, 1, 3, 0)0001
(2, 3, 0, 1)1000
(2, 3, 1, 0)0100
(3, 0, 1, 2)0100
(3, 0, 2, 1)0010
(3, 1, 0, 2)1000
(3, 1, 2, 0)0010
(3, 2, 0, 1)1000
(3, 2, 1, 0)0100
Total:10662

4.0 Three Power Indices for Three Voting Games

Table 3 summarizes and expands on the above calculations. The Penrose-Banzhaf power index need not sum over the players to unity. Accordingly, I break this index down into two indices, where the second index is normalized. The Shapley-Shubik power index is guaranteed to sum to unity. I introduce two other voting games, with corresponding power indices, presented in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 3: Power Indices for (6: 4, 3, 2, 1)
PlayerPenrose-Banzhaf Power IndexShapley-Shubik
Power Index
IndexNormalized
05/165/1210/24 = 5/12
13/163/12 = 1/46/24 = 1/4
23/163/12 = 1/46/24 = 1/4
31/161/122/24 = 1/12

Table 4: Power Indices for (6: 4, 2, 2, 1)
PlayerPenrose-Banzhaf Power IndexShapley-Shubik
Power Index
IndexNormalized
06/16 = 3/86/10 = 3/516/24 = 2/3
12/16 = 1/82/10 = 1/54/24 = 1/6
22/16 = 1/82/10 = 1/54/24 = 1/6
3000

Table 5: Power Indices for (5: 4, 2, 2, 1)
PlayerPenrose-Banzhaf Power IndexShapley-Shubik
Power Index
IndexNormalized
06/16 = 3/86/12 = 1/212/24 = 1/2
12/16 = 1/82/12 = 1/64/24 = 1/6
22/16 = 1/82/12 = 1/64/24 = 1/6
32/16 = 1/82/12 = 1/64/24 = 1/6

5.0 Constitutional Changes

Consider a change in the constitution, from one of the three voting games with tables in the previous section to another such game. The calculations allow one to measure the impact on voting power for any such change. To simplify matters, I consider only rankings of voting power. And, for these three voting games, the three power indices consider here happen to yield the same ranks, for any given voting game out of these three.

Accordingly, Table 6 shows changes in the rules (the "constitution") for these cases. The change to the rules on the right superficially strengthens Player 1, either by increasing the weight of Player 1's vote or requiring less votes to pass a resolution. As noted below, I am unsure what naive intuition might be for the second row. For the third vote, the number of votes needed to pass a proposition is altered such that a simple majority is needed before and after the change in weight.

Table 6: Changing the Rules to Strengthen the Players?
Starting GamePlayer RanksEnding GamePlayer Ranks
(6: 4, 2, 2, 1)0 > 1 = 2 > 3(6: 4, 3, 2, 1)0 > 1 = 2 > 3
(6: 4, 2, 2, 1)(5: 4, 2, 2, 1)0 > 1 = 2 = 3
(5: 4, 2, 2, 1)0 > 1 = 2 = 3(6: 4, 3, 2, 1)0 > 1 = 2 > 3

The first row shows a case where the weight of Player 1's vote increases, which might intuitively give him more power with respect to the apparently weaker Players 2 and 3. Yet this increase in weight also increases the power of Players 2 and 3, even though the weight of their votes does not change. And Player 1 remains equal in power to Player 2, both before and after the change. In fact, the change has no effect on the ranking of the players' voting power.

The second row shows a case where the votes needed to pass a measure declines, after the change in rules, from a super-majority to a simple majority, given the total of weighted votes. Would one expect such a constitutional amendment to strengthen the most powerful, or moderately powerful voters before the change? I find that this change raises the power of the weakest voter to the power of the middling voters. I am not sure this is counter-intuitive, unlike the other two rows.

The third row shows a case in which, like the first row, the weight of Player 1's vote increases. Both before and after the change, a simple majority, given the total of weighted votes, is needed to pass a proposition. This change makes Player 1 more powerful than the weakest player, as one might intuitively expect. But Player 2 is also made more powerful than the weakest player, despite the weight of his vote not varying. And Player 1 ends up no more powerful than Player 2. These effects on Player 2 seem counter-intuitive to me.

6.0 Conclusions

So my examples above have presented somewhat counter-intuitive results in voting games.

I gather that the Deegan-Packel and Holler-Packel are some other power indices I might find of interest. And Straffin (1994) is one paper that explains axioms that characterize some power index or other.

References
  • Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro (1996). Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, Yale University Press
  • P. Straffin (1994). Power and stability in politics. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, V. 2, Elsevier.

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Math Is Power

1.0 Introduction

A common type of post in this blog is the presentation of concrete numerical examples in economics. Sometimes I present examples to illustrate some principle. But usually I try to find examples that are counter-intuitive or perverse, at least from the perspective of economics as mainstream economists often misteach it.

Voting games provide an arena where one can find surprising results in political science. I am thinking specifically of power indices. In this post, I try to explain two of the most widely used power indices by means of an example.

2.0 Me and My Aunt: A Voting Game

For purposes of exposition, I consider a specific game, called Me and My Aunt. There are four players in this version of the game, represented by elements of the set:

P = The set of players = {0, 1, 2, 3}

Out of respect, the first player gets two votes, while all other players get a vote each (Table 1). A coalition, S, is a set of players. That is, a coalition is a subset of P. A coalition passes a resolution if it has a majority of votes. Since there are four players, one of who has two votes, the total number of votes is five. So a majority, in this game of weighted voting, is three votes.

Table 1: Players and Their Votes
PlayersVotes
0 (Aunt)2
1 (Me)1
21
31

One needs to specify the payoff to each coalition to complete the definition, in characteristic function form, of this game. The characteristic function, v(S) maps the set of all subsets of P to the set {0, 1}. If the players in S have three or more votes,v(S) is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. That is, a winning coalition gains a payoff of one to share among its members.

3.0 The Penrose-Banzhaf Power Index

Power for a player, in this mathematical approach, is the ability to be the decisive member of a coalition. If, for a large number of coalitions, you being in or out of a coalition determines whether or not that coalition can pass a resolution, you have a lot of power. Correspondingly, if the members of most coalitions do not care whether you join, because your presence has no influence on whether or not they can put their agenda into effect, you have little power.

The Penrose-Banzhaf power index is one (of many) attempts to quantify this idea. Table 2 lists all 16 coalitions for the voting game under consideration. (The number of coalitions is the sum of a row in Pascal's triangle.) The second column in Table 2 specifies the value for the characteristic function for that coalition. Equivalently, the third column notes which eight coalitions are winning coalitions, and which eight are losing. The last two columns are useful for tallying up counts needed for the Penrose-Banzhaf index.

Table 2: Calculations for Penrose-Banzhaf Power Index
CoalitionCharacteristic
Function
Winning
or Losing
Player
Aunt (0)Me (1)
{}v( {} ) = 0Losing00
{0}v( {0} ) = 0Losing00
{1}v( {1} ) = 0Losing00
{2}v( {2} ) = 0Losing00
{3}v( {3} ) = 0Losing00
{0, 1}v( {0, 1} ) = 1Winning11
{0, 2}v( {0, 2} ) = 1Winning10
{0, 3}v( {0, 3} ) = 1Winning10
{1, 2}v( {1, 2} ) = 0Losing00
{1, 3}v( {1, 3} ) = 0Losing00
{2, 3}v( {2, 3} ) = 0Losing00
{0, 1, 2}v( {0, 1, 2} ) = 1Winning10
{0, 1, 3}v( {0, 1, 3} ) = 1Winning10
{0, 2, 3}v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 1Winning10
{1, 2, 3}v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 1Winning01
{0, 1, 2, 3}v( {0, 1, 2, 3} ) = 1Winning00

The Penrose-Banzhaf index, ψ(i) is calculated for each player i. It is defined, for a given player, to be the ratio of the number of winning coalitions in which that player is decisive to the total number of coalitions, winning or losing. A player is decisive for a coalition if:

  • The coalition is a winning coalition.
  • The removal of the player from the coalition converts it to a losing coalition.

From the table above, one can see that player 0 is decisive for six coalitions, while player 1 is decisive for only two coalitions. Hence, the Penrose-Banzhaf index for "my aunt" is:

ψ(0) = 6/16 = 3/8

By symmetry, the index values for players 2 and 3 are the same as the value for player 1:

ψ(1) = ψ(2) = ψ(3) = 2/16 = 1/8

More than one player can be decisive for a winning coalition. No need exists for the Penrose-Banzhaf index to sum up to one. How much one's vote is weighted does not bear a simple relationship to how much power one has. Also note that the definition of this power index is not confined to simple majority games. Power indices can be calculated for voting games in which a super-majority is required to pass a measure. For example, in the United States Senate, 60 senators are needed to end a filibuster.

4.0 The Shapley-Shubik Power Index

The Shapley-Shubik power index is an application of the calculation of the Shapley value to voting games. The Shapley value applies to cooperative games, in general. For its use as a measure of power in voting games, it matters in which order players enter a coalition. Accordingly, Table 3 lists all 24 permutations of all four players in the voting game being analyzed.

Table 3: Calculations for the Shapley-Shubik Power Index
PermutationPlayer
Aunt (0)Me (1)
(0, 1, 2, 3)v( {0} ) - v( {} ) = 0v( {0, 1} ) - v( {0} ) = 1
(0, 1, 3, 2)v( {0} ) - v( {} ) = 0v( {0, 1} ) - v( {0} ) = 1
(0, 2, 1, 3)v( {0} ) - v( {} ) = 0v( {0, 1, 2} )
- v( {0, 2} ) = 0
(0, 2, 3, 1)v( {0} ) - v( {} ) = 0v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 0
(0, 3, 1, 2)v( {0} ) - v( {} ) = 0v( {0, 1, 3} )
- v( {0, 3} ) = 0
(0, 3, 2, 1)v( {0} ) - v( {} ) = 0v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 0
(1, 0, 2, 3)v( {0, 1} )
- v( {1} ) = 1
v( {1} ) - v( {} ) = 0
(1, 0, 3, 2)v( {0, 1} )
- v( {1} ) = 1
v( {1} ) - v( {} ) = 0
(1, 2, 0, 3)v( {0, 1, 2} )
- v( {1, 2} ) = 1
v( {1} ) - v( {} ) = 0
(1, 2, 3, 0)v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0
v( {1} ) - v( {} ) = 0
(1, 3, 0, 2)v( {0, 1, 3} )
- v( {1, 3} ) = 1
v( {1} ) - v( {} ) = 0
(1, 3, 2, 0)v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0
v( {1} ) - v( {} ) = 0
(2, 0, 1, 3)v( {0, 2} )
- v( {2} ) = 1
v( {0, 1, 2} )
- v( {0, 2} ) = 0
(2, 0, 3, 1)v( {0, 2} )
- v( {2} ) = 1
v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 0
(2, 1, 0, 3)v( {0, 1, 2} )
- v( {1, 2} ) = 1
v( {1, 2} ) - v( {2} ) = 0
(2, 1, 3, 0)v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0
v( {1, 2} ) - v( {2} ) = 0
(2, 3, 0, 1)v( {0, 2, 3} )
- v( {2, 3} ) = 1
v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 0
(2, 3, 1, 0)v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0
v( {1, 2, 3} )
- v( {2, 3} ) = 1
(3, 0, 1, 2)v( {0, 3} )
- v( {3} ) = 1
v( {0, 1, 3} )
- v( {0, 3} ) = 0
(3, 0, 2, 1)v( {0, 3} )
- v( {3} ) = 1
v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 0
(3, 1, 0, 2)v( {0, 1, 3} )
- v( {1, 3} ) = 1
v( {1, 3} ) - v( {3} ) = 0
(3, 1, 2, 0)v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0
v( {1, 3} ) - v( {3} ) = 0
(3, 2, 0, 1)v( {0, 2, 3} )
- v( {2, 3} ) = 1
v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {0, 2, 3} ) = 0
(3, 2, 1, 0)v( {0, 1, 2, 3} )
- v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0
v( {1, 2, 3} )
- v( {2, 3} ) = 1

Table 3 shows some initially confusing calculations in the last two columns, where each of these columns is defined for a given player. Suppose a player and a permutation are defined. For that permutation, let the set Sπ, i contain those players in the permutation π to the left of the given player i. The difference, in the last two columns, is the following, for i equal to 0 and to 1, respectively:

v(Sπ, i ∪ {i}) - v(Sπ, i)

The Shapley-Shubik power index, for a player, is the ratio of a sum to the number of permutations of players. And that sum is calculated for each player, as the sum over all permutations, of the above difference in the value of the value of the characteristic function.

If I understand correctly, given a permutation, the above difference can only take on values of 0 or 1. And it will only be 1 for one player, where that player determines whether the formation of the coalition in the order given will be a winning coalition. As a consequence, the Shapley-Shubik power index is guaranteed to sum over players to unity. In this case, power is a fixed amount, with each player being measured as having a defined proportion of that power.

5.0 Both Power Indices

The above has stepped through the calculation of two power indices, for all players, in a given game. Table 4 lists their values, as well as a normalization of the Penrose-Banzhauf power index such that the sum of the power, over all players, is unity. (I gather that the Penrose-Banzhauf index and the normalized index do not have the same properties.) As one might expect from the definition of the game, "my aunt" has more power than "me" in this game.

Table 4: The Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik Power Indices
PlayerPenrose-Banzhaf Power IndexShapley-Shubik
Power Index
IndexNormalized
06/16 = 3/86/12 = 1/212/24 = 1/2
12/16 = 1/82/12 = 1/64/24 = 1/6
22/16 = 1/82/12 = 1/64/24 = 1/6
32/16 = 1/82/12 = 1/64/24 = 1/6

In many voting games, the normalized Penrose-Banzhauf and Shapley-Shubik power indices are not identical for all players. In fact, suppose the rules for the above variation of Me and my Aunt voting game are varied. Suppose now that four votes - a supermajority - are needed to carry a motion. The normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index for player 0 becomes 1/3, while each of the other players have a normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index of 2/9. Interestingly enough, the Shapley-Shubik indices for the players do not change, if I have calculated correctly. But the values assigned to rows in Table 3 do sometimes vary. Anyways, that one tweak of the rules results in different power indices, depending on which method one adopts. A more interesting example would be one in which the rankings vary among power indices.

Other power indices, albeit less common, do exist. Which one is most widely applicable? I would think that mainstream economists, given game theory and marginalism, would tend to prefer the Shapley-Shubik power index. Felsenthal and Machover (2004) seem to be widely recognized experts on measures of voting power, and they have come to prefer the Penrose-Banzhaf index over the Shapley-Shubik index.

6.0 Where To Go From Here

I have described above a couple of power indices in voting games. As I understand it, many have tried to write down reasonable axioms that characterize power indices. One challenge is to specify a set of axioms such that your preferred power index is the only one that satisfies them. But, as I understand it, some sets of reasonable axioms are open insofar as more than one power index would satisfy them. I seem to recall a theorem that one could create a power index for a reasonable set of axioms such that whichever player you want in a voting game is the most powerful. Apparently, a connection can be drawn between a power index and a voting procedure. And Donald Saari boasts that he could create an apparently fair voting procedure that would result in whatever candidate you like being elected.

I gather that many examples of voting games have been presented in which apparently paradoxical or perverse results arise. And these do not seem to be merely theoretical results. Can I find some such examples? Perhaps, I should look here at some of Daron Acemoglu's work.

I am aware of three types of examples to look for. One is that of a dummy. A dummy is a player that, under the weights and the rule for how many votes are needed for passage, can never be decisive in a coalition. Whether this player drops out or joins a coalition can never change whether or not a resolution is passed, even though the player has a positive weight. A second odd possibility arises as the consequence of adding a new member to the electorate:

"...power of a weighted voting body may increase, rather than decrease, when new members are added to the original body." -- Steven J. Brams and Paul J. Affuso (1976).

A third odd possibility apparently can arise on a council when one district annexes another. Suppose, the district annexing the other consequently increases the weight of its vote accordingly. One might think a greater weight leads to more power. But, in certain cases, the normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index can decrease.

The above calculations for the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices treat all coalitions or permutations, respectively, as equally likely to arise. Empirically, this does not seem to be true. And this has an impact on how one might measure power. For example, since voting is unweighted on the Supreme Court of the United States, all justices might be thought to be equally powerful. But, because of the formation of well-defined blocks, Anthony Kennedy was often described as being particularly powerful in deciding court decisions, at least when Antonin Scalia was still alive. So empirically, one might include some assessment of the affinities of the players for one another and, thus, some influence on the probabilities of each coalition forming. This will have consequences on the calculation of power indices. But why stop there? In the United States these days, politicians only seem to represent the most wealthy.

Update: This page, from the University of Warwick, has links to utilities for calculating various power indices.

References
  • Steven J. Brams and Paul J. Affuso (1976). Power and Size: A New Paradox, Theory and Decision. V. 7, Iss. 1 (Feb.): pp. 29-56.
  • Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover (2004). Voting Power Measurement: A Story of Misreinvention, London Scool of Economics and Political Science
  • Andrew Gelman, Jonathan N. Katz, and Joseph Bafumi (2004). Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis, B. J. Pol. S.. V. 34: pp. 657-674.
  • Guillermo Owen (1971) Political Games, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly. V. 18, Iss. 3 (Sep.): pp. 345-355.
  • Donald G. Saari and Katri K. Sieberg (1999). Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices.

Monday, February 29, 2016

Conservatism According to Corey Robin

I have been re-reading Corey Robin's The Reactionary Mind. According to this book, defending arbitrary hierarchies is the first priority among conservatives. They believe:

  • Workers should obey their masters.
  • Wives should obey their husbands.
  • Downtrodden ethnic groups should obey socially privileged ethnic groups.
  • The laity should obey priests.
  • The non-affluent should show proper deference towards those with great wealth (who could never be malefactors).

These hierarchies have implications for daily lives, not just political rule. For the right, liberty is liberty for the rulers to do as they will, not for those who suffer what they must.

I deliberately do not write about slavery. According to Robin, conservatism is literally reactionary. Conservatives defend hierarchies that are currently threatened or recently overthrown. They focus on restoring what was recently lost. Maybe this has something to do with widespread fear and resentment on the right.

Conservatives often do not have admiration for the rulers of the ancient regime. If those rulers were willing to do what needed to be done to preserve their power, the threats would never have gotten so far, and losses would not have been suffered. The conservative, unlike his popular and complimentary image, is willing to make radical changes so as to reconstruct society as it once was. This seems to go along with the awareness of some contemporary neoliberals that market societies are not natural formations, but must be constructed and maintained by state power. But is this aping of the left consistent with the conservative's encouragement of anti-intellectualism and stupidity? Perhaps the idea is that only an elite need understand the goal, while widespread ignorance among the masses can only help the cause.

The hierarchies that conservatives seek to defend or restore are not meritocracies, in the sense that those on top are expected to have superior intellect, wisdom, or morals. Rulers should demonstrate their fitness to rule by seizing what they can, in war or business. Maybe this has something to do with why many conservatives endorse the supposed "free market", without worrying about externalities, information asymmetries, transaction costs, or market power. One can also see here an echo of Friedrich Nietzsche's overman.

Much of the above comes from the introduction and first couple of chapters of Robin's book. Much of the rest consists of case studies of particular thinkers and polemicists.

Reference

Saturday, June 20, 2015

Election Paradoxes And Faustian Agents

I have been trying to reread Donald Saari on election paradoxes. I have previously considered a few parallels between the Condorcet paradox and models of agents as composed of multiple selves. It seems to me that one could draw more analogies here. I do not plan to pursue the research agenda outlined here - I'm not sure how plausible its results would be. Anyways, Saari provides a comprehensive analysis of a range of voting procedures. Could a fuller range of such procedures - as opposed to pairwise majority rule - be applied to models of multiple selves?

For example, consider a model of a person as having multiple selves, where each one of those selves has a set of preferences over commodities. And suppose the individual, in making choices, resolves those selves with a procedure analogous to an election procedure (e.g., plurality vote, antiplurality vote, Borda Count). Suppose which procedure is used is context-dependent. Can an outside agent modify the context somehow such that the individual follows a different procedure, with consequent effects on the individual's choice?

Or consider two people each composed of the same number of multiple selves, with the preferences of those selves the same across these two people. But suppose each person resolves those selves with a different voting procedure. Maybe these two different voting procedures yield the same "best" choice for one specific menu of choices, but order the non-best choices differently. So if a new menu was created with the best choice removed, these two people - who have identical preferences, in some sense - would make different choices.

I suppose if you follow research along these lines, it would be theoretical research. I do not know how an experiment could elicit the required information to determine the preferences of the multiple selves and the election procedure. I guess the challenge would be to come up with an account consistent with some behavioral anomaly arising in economics experiments. Even better might be to suggest a new experiment and to implement it.

References
  • Donald G. Saari (2001). Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting, AMS.

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Our Rulers Do Not Know Why They Dislike Government Debt

Table 3: The Perceived Importance of Problems Facing U.S.A.
Problem% Wealthy Saying
"Very Important"
Budget deficits87
Unemployment84
Education79
International terrorism74
Energy supply70
Health care57
Child poverty56
Loss of traditional values52
Trade deficits36
Inflation26
Climate change16

A few weeks ago, Paul Krugman mentioned a recent paper by Page, Bartels, and Seawright. I believe it is this one:

This paper reports a pilot study on the political views of the wealthiest Americans. The authors gathered data in interviews with residents drawn from a sample of the very wealthy in Chicago. Page et al. motivate their interest in the policy preferences of wealthy Americans by noting recent research demonstrating that the vast majority of the country has little to no influence on policy decisions made in the Federal government. They hope to expand their research to a national sample in the future.

They report views on many areas of public policy. Generally, our rulers are reactionary and the opposite of benevolent. Business backgrounds in finance or industry, inherited wealth or "earned" wealth, were not correlated with differences in views. The sample size might be too small to provide enough power to distinguish, among the wealthy, effects of where they sit on where they stand. Professionals, mainly lawyers and doctors, tended to be slightly less reactionary.

Above, I reproduce Table 3 from this paper. Those surveyed "think" government budget deficits are the biggest problem facing the United States. One might suggest that lowering such deficits could be only an intermediate, instrumental goal. But towards what end? Page et al. note that they do not seem worried about deficits leading to high rates of inflation; notice how low inflation is as a worry. Page et al. suggest that the wealthy have bought into the "crowding out" argument. Of course, theoretically, supply and demand for savings does not determine interest rates. Empirically, the crowding out argument makes no sense in the current conjuncture either.

I have an old explanation of this puzzle. Paul Krugman recently cited Michal Kalecki's explanation of why capitalists dislike increased government spending in depressions, even though such fiscal policy successfully dampens downswings in business activity. Krugman is not just depending on the capability of Kalecki's explanation to make sense of history long post-dating Kalecki's contribution. Krugman is also aware of the quantitative survey data I cite above.

Monday, April 08, 2013

Political Elites Bowing Down Before The Ones They Serve

Table 1: Politicians in State Legislatures Ignorant of Strength of Constituent Support for Universal Health Care

Table 2: Politicians in State Legislatures Ignorant of Strength of Constituent Support for Gay Marriage

In 2012, Broockman and Skovron surveyed candidates for office in state legislatures throughout the United States. Nearly 2,000 candidates replied. About half of those responding won their races, about half are Democrats, and about half are Republicans. The survey asked the respondents to estimate their constituents' support for the following three policy proposals:

  • Implement a universal healthcare program to guarantee coverage to all Americans, regardless of income.
  • Same sex couples should be allowed to marry.
  • Abolish all federal welfare programs.
Broockman and Skovron also estimated the actual support for these proposals in each of the respondents' districts. Estimates of actual support come out of a multi-level regression and poststratification (MRP) model. The paper contains a neat map of greater Los Angeles showing the results of the MRP model for districts there.

Figures 1 and 2, above, compare the actual support for the first two policy proposals, respectively, to estimated support. If estimates matched actual values, they would lie on the 45 degree line, shown in grey on the graphs. A striking finding is that members of state legislatures tend to think their districts are more conservative than they are. The bias is more extreme for conservative politicians: "Nearly half of sitting conservative officeholders appear to believe that they represent a district that is more conservative ... than the most conservative legislative district in the entire country." Furthermore, politicians learn next to nothing about their constituents' views in running for office.

Broockman and Skovron use these results as a starting point for speculating on how constituents can control their representatives, given these systematic biases in the representatives understanding of opinions among their constituents. As I understand it, this approach fits into a large question within political science, as studied in the United States: How can democracy work even as good as it does in the United States, given the widespread ignorance of the most basic facts about the political system on the part of populace in the United States, including voters? Broockman and Skovron have added a new question: How can democracy work in the United States, given not only ignorance among the populace, but also systematic ignorance on the part of elected officials?

I would like to suggest two hypotheses for explaining these results. First, I suggest legislatures are accurately reflecting the views of their constituents, at least those constituents who matter. Martin Gilens finds that only the policy views of the rich influence what policy gets implemented, at least on the Federal level. Andrew Gelman has shown that the rich tend to be more reactionary in their views.

Second, I would like to suggest that norms of politeness in the United States interacts with conservative minds such that conservatives are systematically underexposed to liberal views among their constituents. I draw on Jonathan Haidt's work here. In some work, he defines five dimensions of moral intuitions:

  1. Harm/care
  2. Fairness/reciprocity
  3. In-group/loyalty
  4. Authority/respect
  5. Purity/sanctity
(Quite a bit of literature exists on the different cognitive styles of conservatives and liberals. Liberals tend to have more activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, and conservatives tend to have a more active amygdala.) Liberals tend to worry more about harm and fairness, while conservatives equally emphasize all five dimensions.

My hypothesis is that conservatives tend to hear those articulating liberal, or even more left views, as being rude. If you are not comforting the comfortable, these days, you are branding yourself as not a member of an in-group that conservatives are loyal to, showing disrespect for our elites, and demonstrating personal impurity. So whether or not they understand liberal views, conservatives are unlikely to perceive such views as any more than eccentricities.

I suppose one could test my first hypothesis by comparing politicians' estimates of their constituents' views with the actual views of those constituents in the top 10% or 1%, by income or wealth. I'm not sure how one would empirically assess my second hypothesis, relating norms of politeness to political views. However one did this, I would think my second hypothesis would apply in a more extreme fashion to rural districts, as compared with urban districts. I do not know how this would apply in suburban districts.

I've probably made my usual share of spelling and grammar mistakes above. But I get to conclude this post, as if it were a journal publication, not a off-the-cuff blog post. More research is needed.

References

Sunday, September 30, 2012

Reproducing Civil Society

"Civil Society - an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system - the means to security of person and property - and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests." -- G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right
"...in the case of the most advanced States, ...civil society has become a very complex structure and one which is resistant to the catastrophic incursions of the immediate economic element (crises, depressions, etc.). The superstructures of civil society are like the trench systems of modern warfare. ... In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying - but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country." -- Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks

There exist at least two approaches to economics:

  • One focused on the allocation of given scarce resources among alternative ends.
  • One focused on the conditions for the reproduction of society.

The first is the approach of the so-called neoclassical theory, and the second is the approach of classical political economy.

I like to write about price theory, a field in which one can formulate certain definite quantitative relationships. But the investigation of conditions that facilitate the reproduction of society can extend well outside of price theory and even of economics, as the above Gramsci quote suggests. I suggest the following are examples of components of civil society, whatever your definition: churches, labor unions, charities, civic groups, professional societies, and athletic clubs.

I am not at all sure that anybody has drawn attention in the literature to this commonality between the works of Gramsci and Sraffa: both analyzed the conditions for the reproduction of society, one concentrating on political theory and the other on price theory.

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Your Opinion Does Not Matter

Figure 1: Bottom Decile Irrelevant To Policy


Figure 2: Top Decile Much More Influential on Policy Than Median

These striking figures are from Martin Gilens (2005). Gilens looks at 1,781 questions from opinion surveys given between 1981 and 2002 and soliciting opinions on policy changes that could be implemented by some combination of the president and the Congress. He codes the question based on whether the policy change was implemented in the four years after the survey was given. As I understand it, for each question he performs a regression based on opinions and income. This allows him to analyze the consistency, for each income percentile, of opinions and policy outcome.

Gilens then looks at questions where people at different income percentiles differ in opinion by at least 8% for his scale. He finds 887 such questions for the 10th and 90th percentile, and 498 questions for the 50th and 90th percentile. As you can see, poor people at the 10th percentile have virtually no impact on policy outcomes, and middle income people at the 50th percentile have only slight impact. Empirically, the United States is a plutocracy.

  • Martin Gilens (2005). "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness", , V. 69, N. 5: pp. 778-796.

Sunday, May 31, 2009

Friedman Blinded Me With Science

Scientists aspire to develop theories that observations can potentially demonstrate to be wrong. Here I examine whether this aspiration can possibly be achieved when economics is practiced in keeping with one of two views on methodology, the deductive-nomological or the instrumental view. I get the argument below from Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (Yale University Press, 1994).

Consider the covering law model, also known as the deductive-nomological view of scientific methodology. In this view, scientists formulate universal laws, in some sense. In an application of a scientific law, the hypotheses or antecedents are asserted to be true. That is, the statement of scientific law is conjoined with initial conditions. One then checks that the consequent holds. If observation is inconsistent with the consequent and one is sure that the initial conditions are true, the law is refuted.

Milton Friedman advocates instrumentalism, in which the assumptions of a scientific theory are false. (Actually, his famous essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics", is so incoherent, Friedman can be interpreted as advocating almost any methodology you care to name. But let's stick with a widely argued view.) In Friedman's view the antecedents are always false in a significant theory:
"Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions" -- Milton Friedman
Thus, if one holds that economic theories state covering laws and that economists are and should be instrumentalists, economic theories cannot be refuted by observation. The logical implications of false antecedents need not be true.

Can economics be a science if it is practiced in keeping with Friedman's strictures?

Saturday, December 06, 2008

How Individuals Can Choose, Even Though They Do Not Maximize Utility

1.0 Introduction
I think of this post as posing a research question. S. Abu Turab Rizvi re-interprets the primitives of social choice theory to refer to mental modules or subroutines in an individual. He then shows that the logical consequence is that individuals are not utility-maximizers. That is, in general, no preference relation exists for an individual that satisfies the conditions equivalent to the existence of an utility function. I have been reading Donald Saari on the mathematics of voting. What are the consequences for individual choice from interpreting this mathematics in Rizvi's terms?

I probably will not pursue this question, although I may draw on these literatures to present some more interesting counter-intuitive numerical examples.

2.0 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Work-Arounds
Consider a society of individuals. These individuals are "rational" in that each individual can rank all alternatives, and each individual ranking is transitive. Given the rankings of individuals, we seek a rule, defined for all individual rankings, to construct a complete and transitive ranking of alternatives for society. This rule should satisfy certain minimal properties:
  • Non-Dictatorship: No individual exists such that the rule merely assigns his or her ranking to society.
  • Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): Consider two countries composed of the same number of individuals. Suppose the same number in each country prefer one alternative to another in a certain pair of alternatives, and the same number are likewise indifferent between these alternatives. Then the rule cannot result in societal rankings for the two countries that differ in the order in which these two alternatives are ranked.
  • Pareto Principle: If one alternative is ranked higher than another for all individuals, then the ranking for society must rank the former alternative higher than the latter as well.
Arrow's impossibility theorem states that, if there are at least three alternatives, no such rule exists.

Arrow's work has generated lots of critical and interesting research. For example, Sen considers choice functions for society, instead of rankings. A choice function selects the best alternative for every subset of alternatives. That is, for any menu of alternatives, a choice function specifies a best alternative. Consider a rule mapping every set of individual preferences to a choice function. All of Arrow's conditions are consistent for such a map from individual preferences to a choice function.

Saari criticizes the IIA property as requiring a collective choice rule not to use all available information. In particular, the rule makes no use of the number of alternatives, if any, that each individual ranks between each pair. The rule does not make use of enough information to check that each individual has transitive preferences. (Apparently, the IIA condition has generated other criticisms, including by Gibbard.) Saari proposes relaxing the IIA condition to use information sufficient for checking the transitivity of each individual's preference.

Saari also describes a collective choice rule that includes each individual numbering their choices in order, with the first choice being assigned 1, the second 2, and so on. With these numerical assignments, the choices are summed over individuals, and the ranking for society is the ranking resulting from these sums. This aggregation procedure is known as the Borda count. Saari shows that Borda count satisfies the relaxed IIA condition and Arrow's remaining conditions.

3.0 Philosophy of Mathematics
Above, I have summarized aspects of the theory of social choice in fairly concrete terms, such as "individuals" and "society". The mathematics behind these theorems is formulated in set-theoretic terms. The referent for mathematical terms is not fixed by the mathematics:
"One must be able to say at all times - instead of points, straight lines, and planes - tables, chairs, and beer mugs." - David Hilbert (as quoted by Constance Reid, Hilbert, Springer-Verlag, 1970: p. 57)
"Thus mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true." -- Bertrand Russell

4.0 An Interpretation
Rizvi re-interprets the social choice formalism as applying to another set of referents. A society’s ranking, in the traditional interpretation, is now an individual’s ranking. An individual’s ranking, in the traditional interpretation, is now an influence on an individual’s ranking. Rizvi’s approach reminds me of Marvin Minsky's society of mind, in which minds are understood to be modular. Rizvi examines the implication’s of Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal for individual preferences under this interpretation of the mathematics of social choice theory.

Constructing natural numbers in terms of set theory allows one to derive the Peano axioms as theorems. Similarly, interpreting social choice theory as applying to decision-making components for an individual allows one to analyze whether the conditions often imposed on individual preferences by mainstream economists can be derived from this deeper structure. And, it follows from Arrow's impossibility theorem, these conditions cannot be so derived in general. Individuals do not and need not maximize utility. On the other hand, Sen's result explains how individuals can choose a best choice from menus with which they may be presented.

References
  • Kenneth J. Arrow (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, Second edition, Cowles Foundation
  • Alan G. Isaac (1998) "The Structure of Neoclassical Consumer Theory", working paper (9 July)
  • Marvin Minsky (1987) The Society of Mind, Simon and Schuster
  • Donald G. Saari (2001) Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting, American Mathematical Society
  • S. Abu Turab Rizvi (2001) "Preference Formation and the Axioms of Choice", Review of Political Economy, V. 13, N. 2 (Nov.): 141-159
  • Amartya K. Sen (1969) "Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions", Review of Economic Studies, V. 36, N. 3 (July): 381-393 (I haven't read this.)
  • Amartya K. Sen (1970) "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal", Journal of Political Economy, V. 78, N. 1 (Jan.-Feb.): 152-157