For Marx, Prices Coordinate Distributed Labor Activities Under Capitalism

Marx provides a supposed proof of the labor theory of value (LTV) in the first section of the first chapter of the first volume of Capital. The worth of his analysis depends on neither the soundness nor the validity of this argument about the third thing. If you are interested in Marx, you should be willing to see where he goes after chapter 1. I find most insightful the last section in chapter 1, the bit on commodity fetishism.

Manufacturing goods in an ongoing society depend on many activities happening in parallel. For example, somebody must be mining iron for the blacksmith to be manufacturing horse shoes out of steel. Under capitalism, nobody is coordinating these activities. For Marx, this coordination results from prices under the anarchy of production characterizing capitalism. Capitalists see whether they are making lots of profits or not in marketing the commodities produced under their direction. Each capitalist adjusts their establishments accordingly.

Marx explains his overall approach to the theory of value in a much-quoted 11 July 1868 letter to Ludwig Kugelmann:

Dear Friend,

The children are getting on well, though still weak.

Thank you very much for the things you sent. Definitely do not write to Faucher, otherwise this mannequin pisse will feel too important. All he has achieved is that, if a second edition appears, I shall aim a few necessary blows at Bastiat where I speak about the magnitude of value. This wasn't done before, since the 3rd volume will contain a separate an extensive chapter about the 'vulgar economy' gentry. Incidentally, you will find it quite natural that Faucher and consorts derive the 'exchange value' of their own scribblings not from the amount of labour power expended, but from the absence of such expenditure, that is from 'saved labour'. Moreover, the worthy Bastiat did not even himself make this 'discovery', so welcome to these gentry, but just 'cribbed' it, in his usual manner, from much earlier authors. His sources are of course unknown to Faucher and consorts.

As for the Centralblatt, the man is making the greatest concession possible by admitting that, if value means anything at all, then my conclusions must be conceded. The unfortunate fellow does not see that, even if there were no chapter on 'value' at all in my book, the analysis I give of the real relations would contain the proof and demonstration of the real value relation. The chatter about the need to prove the concept of value arises only from complete ignorance both of the subject under discussion and of the method of science. Every child knows that any nation that stopped working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a few weeks, would perish. And every child knows, too, that the amounts of products corresponding to the differing amounts of needs demand differing and quantitatively determined amounts of society's aggregate labour. It is SELF-EVIDENT that this necessity of the distribution of social labour in specific proportions is certainly not abolished by the specific form of social production; it can only change its form of manifestation. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing that can change, under historically differing conditions, is the form in which those laws assert themselves. And the form in which this proportional distribution of labour asserts itself in a state of society in which the interconnection of social labour expresses itself as the private exchange of the individual products of labour, is precisely the exchange value of these products.

Where science comes in is to show how the law of value asserts itself. So, if one wanted to 'explain' from the outset all phenomena that apparently contradict the law, one would have to provide the science before the science. It is precisely Ricardo's mistake that in his first chapter, on value, all sorts of categories that still have to be arrived at are assumed as given, in order to prove their harmony with the law of value.

On the other hand, as you correctly believe, the history of the theory of course demonstrates that the understanding of the value relation has always been the same, clearer or less clear, hedged with illusions or scientifically more precise. Since the reasoning process itself arises from the existing conditions and is itself a natural process, really comprehending thinking can always only be the same, and can vary only gradually, in accordance with the maturity of development, hence also the maturity of the organ that does the thinking. Anything else is drivel.

The vulgar economist has not the slightest idea that the actual, everyday exchange relations and the value magnitudes cannot be directly identical. The point of bourgeois society is precisely that, a priori, no conscious social regulation of production takes place. What is reasonable and necessary by nature asserts itself only as a blindly operating average. The vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery when, faced with the disclosure of the intrinsic interconnection, he insists that things look different in appearance. In fact, he prides himself in his clinging to appearances and believing them to be the ultimate. Why then have science at all?

But there is also something else behind it. Once interconnection has been revealed, all theoretical belief in the perpetual necessity of the existing conditions collapses, even before the collapse takes place in practice. Here, therefore, it is completely in the interests of the ruling classes to perpetuate the unthinking confusion. And for what other reason are the sycophantic babblers paid who have no other scientific trump to play except that, in political economy, one may not think at all!

But satis superque [Enough and more than enough]. In any case, it shows the depth of degradation reached by these priests of the bourgeoisie: while workers and even manufacturers and merchants have understood my book and made sense of it, these 'learned scribes' (!) complain that I make excessive demands on their comprehension.

I would not advise reprinting Schweitzer's articles, though Schweitzer has made a good job of them for his paper.

You would oblige me if you sent me a few issues of the Staats-Anzeiger.

You should be able to get Schnacke's address by enquiring at the Elberfelder.

Best greetings to your wife and Fränzchen.

Yours,

K. M.

Apropos. I have received an article by Dietzgen about my book; I am sending it to Liebknecht.

I fault Marx for spending so much time in rewriting volume 1 of Capital after its publication. He should have put more time in preparing the later volumes for publication. Some have recommended that on a first reading, you skip the first chapter. I could see an argument that Marx should have worked on rewriting chapter 1 a few more times.

Markets As Automata, Theory Of Computation, Etc.

I do not expect this post to be well-posed. I suggest that the following researchers provide elements for an interesting approach to economics:

• Michel Callon: Applied Actor-Network Theory to financial markets. [I KNOW EVEN LESS ABOUT THIS.]
• Karin Knorr Cetina: the sociology of finance. Use of algorithms in financial markets.
• Donald MacKenzie: Edinburgh school for sociology of knowledge. Performativity and counter-performativity of financial markets.
• Philip Mirowski: Markets as automata. Parallels with Chomsky hierarchy. Economies as evoloving ecology of market automata.
• Kumaraswamy Vela Velupillai: Constructivism in economics, including in Sraffa's work.

The laws of supply and demand, as presented in neoclassical economics, are muddled and confused. Demand for consumer goods, for eample, is the result of households maximizing some non-existent utility subject to constraints. A market is an unanalyed entity, generally with no brokers who make markets, willing to trade on either side. Although not discussed, the market in neoclassical microeconomics is typically a posted price market, corresponding to the lowest level of the Chomsky hierarchy.

Those who specialize in finance might say they observe something like supply and demand in order books. But those curves are not the supply and demand curves presented in introductory economics and in neoclassical microeconomics. These financial markets are structured, with algorithmic rules for matching bids and offers. They often parallel future markets, capable of going into backwardation and contango.

A certain sort of mathematics is needed to fully analyze markets. I happen to be able to write computer code, in some languages to some extent. And I have been exposed to a perspective that computers should be designed to execute our algorithms, which are abstract mathematical entities independent of such implementation.

At one point, I was quite aware of IEEE 754-2019. IEEE Standard for Floating-Point Arithmetic. At one level of abstraction, I would think of my algorithms as applying to real numbers. I also worried about underflow and overflows and other details. (By the way, some editions of Numerical Recipes contain bugs. You have to read and think, not just copy the code.) I also worried about computational complexity. I probably did not worry about any more than whether or not an algorithm could be implemented in polynomial time and how a parallel implementation can provide speedup. From literature on algorithmetic game theory, I know that if P ≠ NP, complexity classes exist in-between.

So I do not adopt a constructivist approach to economics and mathematics. But I appreciate the provision of algorithms to solve economic problems. And I see that Sraffa does that. I do not know of any evidence that Sraffa and Wittgenstein talked about this, even given Wittgenstein's work on the foundations of mathematics.

Greg Mankiw Confusing Students About Money And Investment

"It was thenceforth no longer a question, whether this theorem or that was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient, politically dangerous or not. In place of disinterested inquirers, there were hired prize fighters; in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetic." -- Karl Marx

Suppose you run a restaurant. You think that you could expand if you paved your parking lot or put a deck up out back. You convince your local bank manager. The bank credits their own account with an asset and credits your account with a loan. That asset, for the bank, is a promise from you to pay off the loan, probably as a series of payments. You spend the money in your account by paying a paving or building contractor.

The bank has created money. No third party must first choose to increase their saving rate and deposit money in the bank. You are able to obtain resources to implement plans for increased production.

The author of a prominent introductory textbook for economics has another, confused story:

Financial intermediaries are financial institutions through which savers can indirectly provide funds to borrowers. The term intermediary reflects the role of these institutions in standing between savers and borrowers. Here we consider two of the most important financial intermediaries: banks and mutual funds.

Banks If the owner of a small grocery store wants to finance an expansion of his business, he probably takes a strategy quite different from that of Intel. Unlike Intel, a small grocer would find it difficult to raise funds in the bond and stock markets. Most buyers of stocks and bonds prefer to buy those issued by larger, more familiar companies. The small grocer, therefore, most likely finances his business expansion with a loan from a local bank.

Banks are the financial intermediaries with which people are most familiar. A primary job of banks is to take in deposits from people who want to save and use these deposits to make loans to people who want to borrow. Banks pay depositors interest on their deposits and charge borrowers slightly higher interest on their loans. The difference between these rates of interest covers the banks' costs and returns some profit to the owners of the banks." -- Greg Mankiw. 2018. Principles of Economics, 8th edition p. 545.

Mankiw then goes on with archaic nonsense about loanable funds and government spending crowding out private investment.

Why do economists teach balderdash?

I have been reading J. W. Mason and Arjun Jayadev's new book, Against Money. I have pointed out Mankiw's confusion and foolishness before.

Competing Ballot Propositions

I have occasionally written about vote-counting protocols.

Onondaga County is to the west of me. Syracuse, NY, is their major city. Members of the county legislature currently have term limits of 12 years. Twelve years is three terms. They are currently arguing about term limits for the County Executive, of 12 or 16 years. The Democrats support the former, and the Republicans support the latter. The County Executive is currently a Republican.

The County Executive has proposed a curious set of ballot initiatives, leaving it up to the voters. One initiative will set a term limit of twelve years. Another will set a term limit of sixteen years. If neither initiative gets a majority of votes, the County Executive will continue to serve without a term limit. If both pass, the one with more votes will prevail.

I do not know if any precedent exists in New York State for dueling ballot initiatives, and, apparently, some argument exists among the county legislature about this question. I suspect the results of votes on California ballot initiatives have posed some such challenge of interpretation.

How to draw district lines and how to count votes is an interesting mathematical question. This question is often entangled with racism in the United States, both in ensuring white supremacy and in fighting it.

Was There A Communist State In Paraguay In The Seventeenth And Eighteenth Century?

People have been organized in diverse ways in many societies across time and space. A communist state existed for a century and a half in Paraguay in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. I doubt many socialists today want this degree of regimentation. This state extended into Argentia and Brazil.

The Jesuits, formally named the Society of Jesus, is a religious order in the Catholic church. The Guarani are an indigenous people in South America.

The Jesuits agreed with the Spanish king, in 1609, to found communities along the Parani River. These communities, called 'reductions', were each organized around a mission. Each was ruled by a cacique, that is, a Guarani chief, under the direction of the Jesuits. Collectively, these missions were eventually called the Rio de Plata missions. They reached a population of almost 150,000 in 30 missions in 1732.

Life in these reductions was regimented under the 1689 General Rules of the Missions. Land was farmed communally, with crops and cattle introduced by the Jesuits. There were also individual fields, albeit with inefficient farming. As with life in a monastery, mornings began with hymns and mass, and many feast days were celebrated. Meals were communal. The Jesuits provided education to the children, as you might expect.

I note above that the population under Jesuit guidance grew to a large extent. Original contact between Europeans and the indigenous people resulted in the spread of deadly, contagious diseases. The Jesuits moved a good portion of the population in the missions twice. The Jesuits armed the population to fend off neighbors who tried to kidnap people to force into slavery. The Guarani thereby had militias. Eventually, the Jesuits moved some communities to more remote areas. Portugal gained territory in Brazil in the Treaty of Madrid in 1750. The Jesuits moved some communities out of Portuguese territory.

This experiment in a theocratic communism came to an end in 1767. Spain expelled the Jesuits from the Americas. This expulsion had more to do with European politics than anything going on in these missions.

Naturally, Jesuits put this history in a good light.

References

• Massimo Livi-Bacci and Ernesto J. Maeder 2004. The missions of Paraguay: the demography of an experiment. Journal of Interdisciplinary History xxxv(2): 185–224.
• Philip Caraman. 1976. The Lost Paradise: The Jesuit Republic in South America. [I have not read this. The title is evocative.]
• Paraguay: The Noble Ruins of Paradise.

Two Ways To Think About Fixed Capital

1.0 Introduction

This post presents two approaches to fixed capital. The first emphasizes power and convention. It emphasizes that the 'money world', as Mason and Jayadev (2026) put it, is not a direct reflection of physical properties of production. The second is much closer to a determined model, with one degree of freedom.

I have at least one previous post, more abstractly on these themes

2.0 Depreciation as Accounting Conventions and Mediated by the Exercise of Power

Robert Paul Wolff points out that how overhead costs are allocated is a political exercise in many firms. Two managers on the same level might each be in charge of the production of a specific product. Suppose these products are produced in the facility. Each manager wants upper management to see that they are making the most profits for the company. In is in the interest of each to see that as much of possible of the overhead for running the facility is applied to their rival's department.

A given machine might be used in multiple production processes, resulting in the production of different products. The allocation of overhead costs here follows the above logic.

Sometimes (many times?), no fact of the matter exists for how to allocate costs. As I understand it, the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) includes different conventions for depreciation. Some models I have seen assume radioactive decay so to speak. Tax law specifies what can be allowed.

3.0 Depreciation and the Economic Life of Machines as an Aspect of Prices of Production

Another way of thinking about fixed capital is as in Sraffa (1960). Enough equations are given for prices to be determined, corresponding to a given wage or rate of profits. The data include inputs and outputs, in disaggregated physical terms, for all combinations of ages of machines. These detailed specifications are not based solely on the age, but the entire history of each machine.

Alessandro Roncaglia showed, back in the 1970s, that a countable infinity of equations can arise when production processes can require inputs of combinations of machines. The theory of pure fixed capital includes assumptions that rule out this possibility.

Sraffa derives the formula for an annuity from his treatment of a machine of constant efficiency. But the analysis generalizes. This approach is in tension with the first approach.

4.0 Conclusion

I will continue exploring mathematical puzzles. I like to think that Sraffa presents the elements of an alternative theory, not just an immanent critique of 'neoclassical' theory. The analysis points outside itself.

Reference

• Mason, J. W. and Arjun Jayadev. 2026. Against Money. University of Chicago.

Jack Birner On The Cambridge Capital Controversy

I have been rereading Jack Birner's 2002 book, The Cambridge Controversies in Capital Theory. Birner is an economist of the Austrian school. He probably generally disagrees with me on lots of matters. Torward the start of the introduction, he writes:

"Four decades ago the best minds in economics were engaged in a confrontation which the entire profession followed in the pages of the leading journals almost as if it were a soccer match. It has become customary to distinguish two opposing groups of economists to the debate..." -- Jack Birner (2002: 1)

And he expresses astonishment that the results of this dispute are ignored:

"What I do want to draw attention to is that the conclusions reached in that debate constitute a rare example of a set of formally proven, uncontestable, undeniably true and reliable results in economics... They can be summarized by saying that the K of the production function that modern economists so confidently and fully rely on for their theoretical and empirical work can only be used in conditions where there is only a single, homogeneous capital good. One does not need to have a degree in economics to know that in reality this is not the case. The economy consists of a bewildering variety of buildings, machines, software, skills and ways of organizing production. And as everyone who has filed a corporate tax declaration knows, it is not even possible to give more than a rather inexact estimate of their value. In other words, not only is there no intuitive justification for the use of aggregate, homogeneous K, we have proofs by Nobel-calibre economists assisted by 100 per cent certain mathematical techniques that demonstrate without a shred of doubt that this K cannot and should not be used for the objectives it is currently used for. Nevertheless, economists go about their business as if these proofs did not exist. That some of them are the very same people who produced these proofs earlier makes things even more curious. The fact that production functions with the same aggregate K figure prominently in all current textbooks of macroeconomics is worse than curious: it is deeply worrying." -- Jack Birner (2002: 1-2)

I do not think the situation is different today. I agree with Birner that the overall point of the CCC is not at all clear from the details of the match. The participants were worrying about local details. I think more was at stake than an aggregate theory. I like to emphasize the labor 'market' in my expositions. Fabio Petri, among others, emphasizes mistakes in what the early marginalists thought could be consistently taken as given in their theory.

Birner considers the role of idealizing assumptions in mathematical models. He considers the relations of such ideal models to models that more 'factual', that is, closer to being able to be applied empirically.

The trend, for decades, in the philosophy of science is to be descriptive, to try to understand how specialists in specific disciplines become convinced of their ideas. The CCC poses a problem for the methodologist.

I'm am doubtful about Birner's methodology at points. He draws upon some scholars I like. For example, he draws on Arthur Koestler's The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe. Koestler points out that Copernicus was focused on narrow points. One of the virtues of a geocentric model, for him, was that it got rid of equants. An equant is a circular orbit that has uniform velocity around a point displaced from its center.

Likewise, economists in the CCC were focused on narrow points about, say, Samuelson's surrogate capital and Robinson's pseudo-production function. For Birner, Sraffa and Garegnani were about the only ones awake.

In some sense, Birner does not resolve his problem. He concludes most economists are still asleep.